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Can Retributivism Be Saved?
Chad Flanders*

Retributive tbeory has long held pride of place among theories of
criminal punishment in both philosophy and in law. It has seemed, at
various times, either much more intuitive, or rationally persuasive, or
simply more normatively right than other theories. But retributive
theory is limited, both in theory and practice, and in many of its
versions is best conceived not as a theory of punishment in its own right,
but instead as shorthand for a set of constraints on the exercise of
punishment. Whether some version of retributive theory is a live
possibility in the contemporary world remains very much an
open question.
In my essay, I consider three interrelated lines of attack against
retributive theories of punishment: first, that it relies on philosophical
assumptions that are either unrealistic or false; second, that the notion
that offenders deserve to be punished, whatever its intuitive appeal, is
possibly an empty idea and in any case one unsuited to a politically
liberal state; and third, that tile abstractness of most versions of
retribution render it unable to offer much in the way of useful, I
or concrete policy advice. I f retributivism is to be taken seriously as a
robust theory of punishment, it needs to provide replies to each of
these lines of criticism.

* Assistant Professor o f Law, St. Louis University School o f Law. Thanks to the
faculty at DePaul Law School for comments on a draft I presented co them, c:spedally Susan
Randes, David Franklin, Andrew Gold, Steven Rrsnicoff, Daniel Morales, and Allison
Tirres. I have: cc:ruinly not answered all o f their concerns. I am also grateful to William
Baude, Christopher llradlcy, and Zach Hoskins for commc:nts and conversations on earlier
drafts. David Svolba helped me think through early versions o f the: ideas presented here: and
Danny Prid gave me numerous, detaikd comments on a near-final draft. Vincent Chiao has
influenced my thinking away from retribution and toward a broader understanding o f the
crimin.ll law. Finally, a Chicago junior faculty workshop challenged me to make
my argument dearer, and also much more modest in its conclusions. Alex Munrges and
Yiqing Wang provided cxcclknt research assistance. All errors arc my responsibility.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Retribution is often taught as one of the major philosophies of
punishment, along with (prominently) deterrence and (less
prominently) rehabilitation. No major casebook omits at least a
cursory discussion of Immanuel Kant on retribution, or James
Fitzjames Stephen on revenge. 1 Retribution, no mere historical
I . One could cite almost any introductory criminal law casebook here, but Joshua
Dressler's seems exemplary in the emphasis he gives to the philosophy o f punishment,
including retribution. S u JOSHUA DRESSLER & STErHEN r. GARVEY, CA.sES AND M.•\TERIALS
0NCIUMIN.-\L L-\W (6th c:d. 2012).
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artifact, has also enjoyed a tremendous theoretical resurgence in the
twentieth and twenty-first centuries as more and more philosophers
and la,vyers spend time articulating, defending, and elaborating
versions of retributivism. Several books published recently testify to
retributivism 's enduring prominence in the halls o f the academy. 2
The so-called retributive revival in theory is here to stay, or so it seems. 3
There is also good reason to believe that retributivism, in perhaps
a cruder and much less sophisticated form, has also been influential
at the practical level. The demand for uniformity in sentencing
reflects the idea that sentences should be roughly the same for all
offenders, which reflects the retributive ideas o f proportionality and
just deserts. 4 More generally, the sentiments that wrongdoers should
be blamed or that wrongdoers deserve punishment are surely
retributive in nature. 5 We believe that when a crime has been
committed and prosecuted, punishment should be imposed
irrespective o f whether this fully maximizes deterrence or
rehabilitates the offender.
But despite this seemingly overwhelming support, retributivism
faces serious challenges both in theory and practice. In theory,
retributivists have ignored or skated over what seems to be a major
(and almost decisive) flaw in their theory: they cannot give any

2. In just the: past two yc:ars, two major colleccions of essays on retribution have
appcilrc:d. Ste RETIUIIUTMSM: ESSAYS ON THEORY ANO l'OUCY (Mark D. White: c:d., 2011);
llETRJBUTIVISM HAS A PAST, DOES IT HAVE A FUTURE? (Mi(fad Tonry c:d., 2011)
[hc:rcinalter Tonry, RETRIIIUTIVISM HAS A PAST]. Whitc:'s book is mostly essays in defense: of
retribution; Tonry's is more balanced. In addition, Michael Tonry has rc:cc:ntly edited an
anthology of writings in philosophy of punishment, in which significant space is given to
retributive theories. S u WHY l'UNISH? How MUCH? 111-95 (Michael Tonry ed., 2011)
[hereinafter Tonry, WHY l'UNISH! I (section on rc:cribucivc chc:oric:s of punishment).
3. For citations on the "retributive: revival," see Chad Flanders, Rarib11tiun II nd
Refurm, 70 Mn. L. REV. 87, 87 & n.l (2010).
4. For a good overview of mandatory minimums in sentences, sec Erik Luna & l'aul
Cassell, M1111dlfrory Milli11111/im1, 32 CARnOZO L. REV. l {2010); see nlso id. at 11 (connecting
mandatory minimums to retributive justifications for punishment}. The cl:1ssic deti:nsc of
uniformiry in sentencing is MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CtuMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT
ORnER {1973). See gmcrnlly ANniu;w VON HIRSH, DOING JUSTICE (1976) (defending the
strict retributive theory of punishment). For an c:xcdknt overview of "equality" in sentencing,
sec James Q. Whitman, Eq1111/ity i11 Crimi1llfl UIJP: 17,e Tiro Dii>e'J}mt Wmem R.ulfdt, l I.
LEGALANALYSIS 119 (2009).
5. S u James Q. Whitman, A l'len A.!}lfinst R.ctrib11tii>is111, 7 BUFF. CIUM. L. REV. 85, 85
(2003). Jdliic Murphy makes a more general dcfi:mc: of the: so-called "retributive emotions"
(blame, hatred, resentment) in JEFFRJE G . .MURl'HY & }E.-\N HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND
MERCY ( 1990).
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meaningful account of proportionality in punishment. 6 This has been
recognized before by scholars, but no retributivist has so far given an
entirely satisfactory answer to the basic question: how do we teU
exactly how much punishment offenders deserve? The fact that
retributivism places so much emphasis on proportionality ( or
fairness) in punishment, but cannot offer much illumination about
what proportionality i s - o r how to achieve it-is a key insight that
something has gone wrong with retributive theory, even on its own
terms. Indeed, it suggests deeper problems about the very idea of
"deserved" punishment. Retribution has too easily been allowed to
"punt" on spelling out what proportionality in punishment mcans. 7
Retributivism has also been increasingly seen as being limited
practically. One major example is that by describing deserved
punishment in terms of justice, scholars and practitioners have made
deserved punishment seemingly resistant to fiscal considerations. 8
But it turns out, unsurprisingly, that punishment is a serious financial
drain on state and federal budgets, so prudent legislators and citizens
are now saying that punishment needs to be looked at pragmatically
and not as a matter of punishing offenders come what may. This is a
serious, indeed monumental,9 shift in the politics of punishment on
the ground, and unfortunately retributivists have little to say
about it. 10
6. A particularly good statcmcnt o f this problem is in Hugo Adam Bedau, A
R,rrib11tire 11m1r_v of rite Pardoning l'oiver?, 27 U . RICH. L. RE\'. 185, 198 ( 1993), who calls
defining proportion:iliry the uvery heart o f darkness" for the rerributivist. For an extensive
discussion o f the problem, sec MICHAEL J. ZIMMEIV,IAN, THE llllMORJ\UlY OF
PUNISHMENT (2011 ). In his inuoduction to RETRIBUTIV!SM HAS A PAST, DOES IT HAVE A
FUTURE?, Michael Tonry notes the problem, but docs not (to my mind) appreciate its depth.
S u Tonry, RETRIBUTMSM HAS A PAST, mpra note: 2, at 1 (expressing frustration at recent
reuibutivist thought to s:iy anything meaningful about proportionality).
7. I have: been guilty o f punting in the past. Sre Dan Markc:l & Chad Flanders,
Bmt/J11111 1111Stilrs: 11u Li111ittd Releranre o f S11bjrctirity ro llerrib11tiPr Jmtite, 98 CALIF. L.
REV. 907, 951-52 (2010) (rejecting the insistence that retribution answer questions o f
proportionality, and saying that such qucstions arc institutional, not conceptual}.
8. For a sensitive examination o f this problem, but with (in my opinion) a less than
satisfactory answer, sec Michael T. Cahill, Rerribmil'e J11stiee i11 the Real World, 85 WASH. U .
L. REV. 815 (2007).
9. Especially given that it has meant conservatives arc now mobilizing against long
(and expensive:) sentences. For :in cxcc:!lcnt sun·ey o f this dcvdopmc:nt, sec David Dagan &
Steven M . Teles, 77,e Co11sen•11tive War 011 Prisons, WASH. MONTHLY, Nov.-Dec. 2012, :it 25,
25-31. For more on the role: o f cost in criminal justice more generally, sec C l u d Flanders, Cosr
11111 Smwui,1g Factor: Misso11ri's Experiment, 77 M o . L. REV. 391 (2012).
10. Sec: my disrnssion i11fr11 Part II I.
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In my essay, I try to diagnose in what ways traditional
retributivism has gotten things wrong and how to fix them. In truth,
the solution may be to largely abandon retribution as a theory of
punishment. 11 What retributivism gets right is that there should be
some constraints on how and why punishment is implemented. We
should not punish the innocent. We should not, as a rough matter,
punish less severe crimes more harshly than how we punish more
severe crimes. These two features of retribution all
them the
innocmce constmiut and the p,·oponionality constMint-are two
things that retribution has gotten right. But retribution goes wrong
when it translates these features into insights on the aims of
punishment generally instead of limiting them to how punishment
should be distributed. Retribution goes wrong when it endeavors in
the first instance to explain tvhy people desen1e punishment. In fact,
deterrence theory is largely right that people should be punished
because it improves the safety of society, and for no other reason. I f
retributive theory is to find its proper place, it will be as part of an
overall theory that takes deterrence as the ultimate justifying aim of
punishment, not one that begins and ends with retributive
considerations.
The consequences of the retributive mistake have been
unfortunate both in theory and practice. By seeking out a theory of
desert, retributive theory has spent time explaining how punishment
might be a good thing, for both those being punished and for the
rest of society, beyond the fact that punishment might increase
society's safety. This idea, that punishment is an int1·insic good, is not
only fruitless, it is harmful because it encourages the notion that
those who arc punished benefit somehow from their punishment, so
that if we failed to punish them, we would be hurting them by
violating their right to be punished. 12 This rather strange notion has
its roots in Kant and Hegel, and makes little sense considered

11. Rut, as I go on to note, this does not mean abandoning certain norms usually
associated with retribution. The: problem comes in thinking that 011/y if we: adopt retribution ;u
a theory can we endorse those norms.
12. Alice Risuoph has emphasized this point in her recent work. Alice Risuoph, Respect
11111I Rtsist1111ec in P1mislm1tnt 17uory, 97 CALIF. L. REv. 601 (2009). However, Rlstroph seems
to me to take her point too far, into a gc:ncr.dizcd skc:ptidsm about state authority, a skepticism
which I reject. S u Flanders, mpra note 3, at 133-37 ( contrilsting Hobbes and Smith on the
legitimacy ofst:1te punishment). On the "right to be punished," sec John Dcigh, 011 the R(qbt
tu Be P1mished: Same Doubts, 94 ETHICS 191, 195-97 { 1984).

313

BIUGHMvl Y O U N G UNIVERSITY L A W R E V I E W

2014

outside of their metaphysics, yet it persists in modern philosophical
writing about punishment.
Moreover, by focusing on the intrinsic bendit of punishment,
retributivists have seemed to shift their focus away from the practical
problems of crime and punishment: how to reduce crime by
preventing it from happening, how to improve the lives of those in
prison, how to ease the reentry of prisoners back into society. These
are irrelevant to the question of what justifies punishment in the way
retributivism often conceives of it. This focus on punishment may in
some sense be excused as methodological: retributivists are interested
just in justifying the act of punishment and nothing else. But
punishment is just one part of a complex network of criminal justice,
and the focus on one part of that network at the expense of others
(which is what retributivists do) can result in a distorted picture o f
crime and punishment. There is some exciting empirical work being
done on stopping crime and reducing punishment, which
rctributivism takes very little account of, if at all. 13
Retributivism, I conclude, risks ringing false when it stops merely
being a theory of some rational constraints on punishment and
instead turns into a theory of why we have punishment at all: it
makes what should be at the outer bounds of a theory of
punishment into its core. For the fact is, we have punishment in
order to make society safer by controlling crime, and not primarily to
give people what they deserve. 14 To be sure, not every kind of
punishment should be tolerated in pursuit of this goal, and this is
where retributivist constraints on punishment can be both necessary
and helpful, by providing the outer framing of the pursuit of our
criminal justice goals. But retributivism goes wrong when it presents
itself as an independent good, something we should seek out for its
own sake. Everything that is valuable about retribution as a full-

13. Sre, illter fliill, DAVJO M. KENNEOY, DON'T SHOOT! ONE MAN, A STREET
FELLOWSHIP, :\NO THE ENO OF VIOLENCE IN INNER.·CITY MtERICA (2011) (describing the:
author's c:xpc:ricncc: with various crimc:•rc:ducing programs); M:\JlK A.R. KLEIMAN, WHEN
URUTE FORCE FAILS: HOW TO HAVE LESS CRJME ANO LESS PUNISHMENT (2009) (prO\·iding
cmpiric:d studies ;ind thc:orctical analrsis o f what reduces crime:).
14. Herc I follow H.L.A. Hart in his analysis of the justifying ground" o f punishment.
See H.L.A. Harr, A Proli:.,tr1111u 11a ro r/Je Primiple1 o f P1mi1l1111mr, it, Tonry, WHY PUNISH?,
mprn note: 3, at 195-205.
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blown theory of punishment can be reformulated into retribution as
a theory of side constraints on punishment. 15
My essay divides into three major parts, each developing a part o f
the critique of retributivism. In the first part, I look at the substance
of some o f the major historical and contemporary theories o f
retribution: Kant and Hegel on the one hand (historical), and
Herbert Morris and Jean Hampton on the other (contemporary).
Kant and Hegel's theories either rely on barely comprehensible, and
probably false, metaphysics, while Morris and Hampton's theorieswhile dispensing with the dubious metaphysics-only obliquely
touch facts about real people. The problem with both types of
retribution (the historical and the contemporary) turns out to be
similar: retributivists take an important point about the limits o f
punishment-that it should not be imposed on the innocent and
should not be grossly disproportionate to the crime-as an insight
into the pm'jJose of punishmc:nt. But Rawls and Hart, in remarkably
similar essays published at roughly the same time, 16 had it right: the
011em/l purpose of punishment should be utilitarian, not retributive.
The second part o f my essay attacks the intuition that grounds
much sophisticated retributive thought: the idea that people deserve
punishment for their crimes. What is this notion of desert? Using
insights from John Rawls's work on distributive justice, I question
whether we have any firm grasp on the idea of prcinstitutional
retributive desert. Indeed, the inability of retributivists to say
anything meaningful about proportionality shows the truth o f this
insight. We have no grasp on what a .. proper" punishment would be
because the idea of determinate desert prior to institutions that can
give desert a shape and meaning is incoherent. I f we insist, contrary
to Rawls, that we do have a concrete idea of desert prior to
institutions, either this idea o f desert cannot give us meaningful
guidance when it comes to sentencing, or it relics on a set of
metaphysical beliefs that should not ground a politicll conception of
justice.
The final part focuses on the practical failings of retributive
theory. When we look to retribution for solutions or even
suggestions on what to do about criminal justice in our present
15. For the idc:1 of u5idc constraincs" on action, sec, e.g., R.ollE!tT NOZICK, ANAllCHY,
STATE,,U-0 UTOl'IA ( 1974).
16. Ste illjrr1 note 79.
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condition, we either find that retributivism is virtually silent, or it
points us in the wrong direction. With cost containment, retribution
says cost is irrelevant and we should ignore it. With mandatory
minimums, retribution says we should work to make all sentences
mandatory. On the death penalty, retribution gives a strong
justification for it, despite recent (heroic, but misguided) efforts by
rctributivists to assert the contrary. Finally, with the phenomena of
mass incarceration, retribution says that it is justified if the
punishments were deserved, which is simply to deny that mass
incarceration itself is a problem at all.
My conclusion touches on the old question o f whether
retribution is just a stand-in for rcvcnge. 17 I conclude that it is not,
or at least not entirely, but rather that retribution and revenge share
a very important characteristic, which makes them both
inappropriate to be taken seriously as theories o f punishment: they
isolate themselves from consideration o f consequences, and any
purposes other than the "intrinsic" good of punishment itself-a
good which, if it exists, is no good at all.
II. RETRIBUTIVISM: A CRITIQUE OF THE MAJOR THEORIES

A. Kant and Hegel
The hero and godfather o f rctributivists is surely Immanuel
Kant. 18 Although he is widely cited, or at least parts o f him, Kant's
philosophy is little understood and perhaps for good reason. Kant's
major discussion o f retribution in his Metaphysics of Mm·als includes
some passages that are hard to understand outside o f Kant's
sometimes extravagant and dubious metaphysics. Indeed, few accept
all of what Kant says in these passages, though many think that there
arc still ideas worth salvaging in his work, if only we arc careful. But
it remains to be seen whether these "good" ideas can be separated
from Kant's larger metaphysical beliefs, and even i f they can be,
whether they are plausible ideas taken by themselves.
The two major ideas that modern retributivists take over from

17. For the: classic rcbutul to this charge, sec: RollERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL
EXl'LANATIONS 366-68 ( 1981 ).
18. In referring to Kant, I will be mostly using the excerpt found in Immanuel Kant,
17,e Pm11/ Law 1111d t/Je Law of P11rdo11, ill Tonry, WHY PUNISH?, 111pr11 note 2, at 31-36
[hereinafter Kant, l'e,111/ Law).
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Kant are these: the idea that punishment necessarily expresses respect
for those who are punished, and second, chat punishment should be
proportional to the crime. The first idea, I think, is largely mistaken.
The second idea is correct, but it turns out to be a mostly empty
idea. Modern interpreters of Kant are hard pressed to give content to
Kant's idea of proportionality once it is divorced from Kant's
metaphysics.
1. Respect

Start with the idea that punishment expresses respect for those
who commit crimes. According to Kant's conception of the social
contract, anyone who wills a crime, also wills that he be punishedhe has done the crime to himself. 19 To fail to punish the person who
commits the crime, then, is to fail to treat him as a willing subject in
his own right, to fail to respect his choices, It is to treat him instead,
perhaps, as someone who is to be managed or controlled and not as
a person. 20 That, for Kant, is almost the paradigm case of disrespect,
and any self-respecting person will accordingly ivant to be
punished. 2 1 Hegel, in this seemed to be substantially in accord with
Kant. Indeed, he seemed to pick up Kant's idea and run with it. To
not punish a person who had done wrong would be to dishonor
him, Hegel said; punishing is a way of "honoring" the choosing
subject. 22
This idea has some intuitive appeal. If we do not hold someone
responsible for their actions, and instead say that is the result of
social factors beyond their control, we may diminish them as
persons. C.S. Lewis gave great rhetorical support to this idea in his
19. Id. at 32 ("Accordingly, any undeserved evil that you inflict on someone else among
the people: is one that you do to yourself.").
20. Id. at 31-32 (stating that a person can only be punished "on the ground that he has
.:ummittcd a crime:; for a human being can nc:ver be manipulated mc:rc:!y as .1 mc:ans to the:
purposes of someone dse and can never be: cunfusc:d with the: objects ufthc: L:iwofthings. ).
21. See, e,g., id. at 33 (expressing that a man of honor would choose: to be: punishc:d
according to his dc:sc:rt, even if this mc:ant death). Hc:gd would latc:r pick up and run with this
idea. Ste G. W. F. Hegel, Wrong [Dnr U11nd1t/, ill Tonry,mpra note:?, at -lS-46 ("In so far as
the punishment which fthc: act oftlu: criminal] emails is sec:n as embodying the ,rimi11nl's11wn
rig/Jr, tl1c: criminal is /Jo111111red as a rational bc:ing.-Hc: is denied tl1is honour if the: concc:pt and
criterion of his punishment arc not derived form his own act; and he is also denied it if he is
rc:gardc:d simply as a harmlul animal which must be: rendered harmless, or punishment \ ith a
view to deterring or reforming him.").
22. S u G.W.F. Hegel, IV1·011g [Dar U11nd1r/, in Tonry, mpra note: 2, at 45-46.
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classic essay on the humanitarian theory o f punishment: treating
someone as not responsible for his actions because he couldn't really
control himself can be insulting; it is as if we see him more as a child
than as an adult human being. 23
But we need to question each part o f Kant's analysis. Initially, is
it true that a person who chooses to commit a crime chooses to be
punished? A s an empirical matter, this is certainly not true: those
who commit crimes by and large do not want to be punished, they
want to commit a crime and they want to get away with it. They do
not want to suffer the consequences o f their criminal act. They want
to enjoy the benefit o f the laws, without having to pay the price
when they break those laws. Kant thought that no one would object
to being sentenced to death for murder, and that people would
laugh at anyone condemned to death said he was being punished too
harshly/' in that, we can see, he was clearly wrong. 5
O f course, Kant was not simply making a descriptive claim.
Rather, his point was that as a transcendent matter when people
choose to commit a crime they are in fact choosing to be punished.
And so, even if they do not actually want to bc punished, t/Jey are
committed tmmcendmtally to willing their punishment. 26 So we
respect people when we punish them, even if their empirical wills are
suggesting {pleading?) that they would rather not want this form o f
"respect." We respect criminals by taking their actions seriously, as
acts o f responsible agents and not o f children or animals or robots
who could not have known better or who could not have done
othcrwise. Kant's version o f this argument requires a lot o f
suppositions about the original social contract, but we can put those
to one side. 27 Most contemporary defenders o f Kant do not appeal,

91.

23. Set C.S. Lewis, T11e H11111,rnitariti11 T11tory of l'rmishmrnt, iii Tonry, s11pra no1e 2, at

24. K.lnt, Pmal La111, mpra no1e 18, at 34.
25. Corey Brcttschncider, 771, Rights of tlie G11ilty: P1111ish1ne11t and P/1/itiml Le qitimncy,
35 POL. THEORY 175-99 (2007) (arguing that, on a contractualist theory, peopl,: would not
consent to the death penalty).
26. Id. at 35 ("When, therefore, I enact a penal law agains1 mysclf as a criminal it is the
pure juridical legislative reason (IJon10 11011mmu11) in me that submits itself to the penal law as a
person capable: of committing a crime, that is, as another person (lin,no pha&11/lllt11/111) along
with all du: od1crs in the civil union who submit d1c:msdvc:s to this law.").
27. Id. K.lnt imagined thu we "1ranscendcntally" agreed to a contract where, ifwc were
to commit a crime:, we consent to being punished. Set Immanuel Kam, 17ieor_v a,1d l'rartice
Cu11ur11i1,g the Co111111011 Snyi11g: TT1is May Be Tr11e i11 17,eory brit Does Nrit App(v in Practice, ill
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explicitly anywa.y, to them: they reject the idea that we arc literally
honoring people's choices by punishing them. 28 Instead, they focus
on the idea that punishment is a way of showing respect for people:
by taking their choices seriously, as choices o f responsible agents.
I am suspicious o f this form o f "respect." For one tl1ing, it does
not seem true that we respect people 011/y by punishing them. For
example, we could try to rehabilitate or even forgive them. 29 Both of
these methods o f responding to a crime do not seem to diminish our
respect for that person qua person, or treat them merely as products
of social forces. Indeed, both rely on treating that person as a penon
either by encouraging him to see the wrongness o f his ways
(forgiveness) or helping him change into a better person
(rehabilitation). It seems cruel and wrong to think that the only way
(or the best way) of relating to a person who has done wrong is
punishing him. EYcn the idea that therapy shows lack of respect for a
person seems hopelessly outdated: the remnants o f a culture that was
fearful of psychological explanations o f human behavior, fearful that
it would simply show us as a product of dark, unconscious drives. 30
Therapy now seems positively humanistic in contrast to the nowdominant biological (and reductive) understandings of human nature.
In short, there are many ways to treat a person as a responsible
agent, and only a narrow set of them involves actually punishing the
person, by subjecting them ro either physical or psychological
suffering. Think o f the different ways we hold others responsible for
doing something wrong in our daily lives. We hold others
responsible by criticizing them, shaming them, expressing
disappointment in them, rebuking them, shunning them,
badmouthing them, yelling at them. All o f these acts presuppose that
a person has done something wrong, and that tl1is wrongdoing
requires censure. But they all stop short-some very far s h o r t - o f
punishment. Even the plausible, lesser claim by Kant, which is not
that we will our punishment but that we ought to be taken seriously
THE PHILOSOPHY OF K,\NT 421-22 (Carl J. Friedrich trans., l 949).
28. Most contemporary Kantians rc:jc:ct the: idc:a o f a ttansccndcntal contract, but hold
on to the: idea o f a "hypothc:tic.tl contr.tct." The question still remains, however, whether such
a contract is binding. On this lattc:r question, tee Dan Brudm:y, Hypotlmical Cu,,smt a11d Moral
Fr,rcr, IO L\W & l'HIL. 235 ( 1991 ).
29. S u Deigh, supra note 12.
30. Su, e.g., C.S. Lewis, 171e H11111a,1irarian 17,eor_v nf P1misl111w1t, ill Tonry, mpra note:
2, at 91 (expressing distress about treating crime: as a "disease'• and needing to be: cured).
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as responsible agents when we do wrong, does not give us :m
argument for punishing people.
But there is in fact another flaw in the idea that punishment is
the only way to show respect, one relating to the moment the person
chooses to disobey the law. Kantian rcspect-as•punishment seems to
rely on the idea that those who commit crimes are fully autonomous
when they choose their crime, and they express their full, true selves
in choosing. This also seems to be empirically incorrect, and not
many would hold to the idea that those who grow up in rotten social
circumstances have full autonomy, and fully choose their crimes.
Kant of course felt otherwise: his view of the will was that no matter
0111" empirical cfrcumstances we can rise above them, and choose the
right path. 3 1 This is our transcendental or noumenal freedom, which
we always retain, even in the most trying of circumstances. Social
psychology has shown tl1is type of freedom-freedom from any and
all circumstances-to be simply nonexistent. A lot depends on group
dynamics, or how we frame the situation, not on our
transcendental freedom. 32
Now, consider: does it diminish our respect for a person if we
show the victim has had a history of abuse in his family, or that he
has brain damage, or that he has been addicted to drugs? It would
diminish 1·espect for him only if we saw a fundamental incompatibility
b e t ween sympathy and respect such that acknowledging difficult
social circumstances or mental or psychological difficulties meant no
longer relating to a person as a person. 33 But there seems no
necessary conflict between these two points of view. At the very least,
31. K:ant hdd that it was always p11Siiblc that we: act in accord with the dicmc:s of
moraliry. Set, e.g., K-\NT, CRITIQUE OF PMC.'TICAL REASON 5:30 (M:uy McGregor trans.,
1996) {"Ask [someone:] whether, if his prince: demanded, on pain o f . . , immediate: execution,
that he: gi\'c: false: testimony against an honourable man who the: prince would like: to destroy
under a plausible pretext, he would consider it possible to overcome his Jove of life . . . . He
would perhaps not venture: to assert whether he would do it or not, b11r /Je 11rnsr admit ivi1/J1111t
lmitatiot1 1/Jnt it 1ro11ld be possible for /Jim. He: judges, therefore, rhat he can do something
because: he: is aware that he: nughr to do it and recognizes freedom within him, which, wirhout
the moral law, would ha\'c remained unknown to him."> (emphasis added).
32. This has bc:c:n the upshot of much work in behavioral psycholob'Y· S u grnm,l(v
JOHN M. DORIS, LACK OF CHARACTER: l'ERSONAUTY AND MORAL BEHAVIOR (2005); LEE
Ross & RICHARD E. NISIIElT, THE l'E11SON AND TIIE SITUATION: l'ERSl'ECTIVES OF SOCIAL
l'S\'CHOLOG\' (2d cd, 201 IJ
33. For a sensitive reflc:crion on the rdationship bc:twc:c:n knowins the details of a
person's past and still respecting him or her as a person, see Martha Nussbaum, E q 11iry 1111d
Mem, 22 l'HIL. & l'UR.AFF. 83 (1993}.
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we might acknowledge that not all crimes are the result of fully
aware, fully informed, fully controlled choice, and that this should
make a difference as to whether punishment shows respect for a
person's choices. 34
A large amount of the rhetorical strength of the Kantian view
involves contrasting it with a deterrence based view: if we punish
only to scare people, or to threaten them with terrible consequences
if they commit a crime, then this treats people as means rather than
as ends. We treat them as dogs, as Hegel famously said. 35 But in fact,
this strikes me as eminently debatable. Certain threats require
treating people as autonomous, choosing agents, who understand
the consequences of their actions and can be expected to alter their
behavior accordingly. Nor does it seem incompatible with respect to
punish someone if this is necessary for the safety of the community,
or to set an example for others. It would be wrong to punish
someone only for these goals and not because he had committed an
offense. But this is a side constraint on deterrence, not a replacement
of deterrence with some other (retributive) goal. 36
A final point on respect: whatever the merits of the idea of
transcendental respect by punishing someone who has committed a
crime, it may still be the case that the actual conditiom of American
prisons and jails mean that those who are incarcerated there are not
being treated with respect. 37 Respect suggests some constraints on
how we treat people, and not merely that we treat them as
responsible agents. Unless it is any punishment that will show
respect (and I am doubtful that modern Kantians believe this;
certainly Kant thought there were limits to how harsh and disgusting
punishments can be 311), there may be some punishments that fail to
34. le seems to me :i f.iirly common fem1re of modern life that we ascribe some things
in a pc:rson 's bchavior to chemical or psyd1ological factors without at the s:imc time: absolving
them from all responsibility r,r cl1inking cl1ac thcy arc no longer "pcrmns." Note cl1at cl1c
question of whether people with bad social back g r ounds or psychological disorders should be
pm,isbed is a separate question th.1n whcthcr punishing them is always neccssar)· in ordcr to
r&sptet a pcrson, when he or she: has committed a crime:.
35. Ste ROBERT R. WILLIAMS, HEGEL'S ETHICS OF RECOGNITION 168 (1997} (using
deterrence to justify punishment is like clue:itcning a dog with c:1.ning).
36. For an excdlc:nt development of cl1is point, ste Zach Hoskins, Dettrrmt J>rmislmrmt
n11d Rtspm fur l'mum, 8 OHIO. ST. J. CRIM. L. 396(2011 ).
37. Su, e.g., Brown v. l'lau, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011) (illuscr:iting conditions in
California prisons).
38. Sec the discussion of Kant on rape, i11frn at norc 18.
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show respect to prisoners, because they are cruel, or demeaning, or
inhumane. Such may be the reality of many prisons and jails in America. 39
O f course, the Kantian may respond that this is an argument to
reform prisons and jails; indeed, I have suggested this argument in
the past, in a retributive spirit. 40 But this supposes that such an
argument can be made from within Kantian philosophy; that Kant
can give us a sound argument-one which modern Kmtians can
adopt and adapt-that some conditions are disproportionate to the
crime that has been committed, so that we can say some
punishments are in fact disproportionate. This is an argument at
bottom about proportionality, which I turn to next.

2. Proponionality

Kant's argument that punishment is a gesture of respect is, I
think, ultimately wrongheaded and should be rejected. It is not a bar
to treating people with respect to have an institution o f punishment
that works primarily to reform them, or to deter others from
committing similar crimes (or even to have no institution o f
punishment at all}. But Kant's claim about respect was linked to
another one, which some have also found persuasive. Kant says that
those who commit a crime will their punishment upon themseh·es,
but this begs the question: how much should they be punished? And
Kant's answer is exactly to the extent that they b1·oke the Jaw. For Kant,
this was the old doctrine of j11s talionis, or an eye for an eye and a
tooth for a tooth.-11
Kant again reinterpreted the doctrine, rather brilliantly, in terms
of the criminal as willing his punishment. A person who commits a
crime not only wills chat he be punished, but also that his
punishment be the very crime he committed. He has agreed to this,
again, transcendentally speaking. Kant's best example is the death

39. This is yc:t another way in which Kant's theory may be: better considered a theory
for tltc ideal world, and not for our real world.
40. Flanders, Rrtri/111tio11 ,md Reform, mprn notc: 3, at 104.
41. Kant, Pmnl Lnw, mprn note 18, at 32 ("What kind and what degree of punishment
docs public legal justice adopt as its principlc: and standard/ None: other than tl1c: principle: of
c:quality . . . that is, thc: principle of not treating one side: more favorably than the other.
Accordingly, any undeserved evil that you inflict on someone else among the people is one you
do to yourself.").
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penalty. A person who kills another deserves nothing less than to die,
because he has chosen it. 4 2 There is no possible substitute for death
as his punishment. For other crimes, however, it is harder to see how
this principle of reciprocity should work. Kant said that the thief
makes another's property insecure, and so lie should have his
property made insecure. 43 But how do we do this? Do we do it by
stealing from the thief? Or do we simply demand restitution? Kant,
somewhat convolutedly, suggested that the person who stoic may be
used by the state for "convict labor", "so he becomes a slave, either
for a certain . . . time or indefinitely, as the case may be." 4 4 But it is
not obvious that slave labor is anything like a commensurate
punishment for theft.
Rape presented an even harder case for Kant, who said that to
rape the rapist would be undignified:15 He suggested castration
instead. There are t wo problems with this response, however. The
first is that the idea that some punishments might be undignified is
an external constraint on le.,c talionis, not something that is contained
within it: the true retributivist, one might surmise, would grit his
teeth and rape the rapist, if that is what the just punishment was in
chat case, given the requirements of proportional punishment.
Moreover, if Kant were consistent, he might use the same argument
against the death penalty, for killing somebody might be thought to
treat someone in an undignified way. But Kant does not make this
move, because for him, an execution is not the same as an unjustified
killing. One wonders, then, why Kant could not say the same thing
about a (judicially authorized, morally required) rape against a rapist. 46
The second point against the rape example is that castration does
not seem as proportio11ate as the act of rape. We could run the
argument in either direction. We could say that, because castration is
permanent, and rape is not, castration is a worse harm to the rapist
than the rape was to the victim (and certainly castration was not
42. Id. at 33 ("If . . . he: has committed a murder, he: must Jie. In this case:, there: is no
substitute: that will satisfy the: rc:quirc:mc:nts oflc:gal justicc:.tt).
43. Id. For an illuminating (but also inconclusive:} discussion of this cxampk, sec: David
Gray, l'1mis/J,nmr ns S11fferi119, 63 VANn. L. REV. 1619, 1663-1665 (2010).
44. K.mt, l'mnl Lmr, mprn note: 18, at 33.
45. lMAlANUEL KANT, THE METAl'H\'SICS OF MORALS 130 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans.,
Cambridge: Univ. l'rcss 1996} (1797}.
46. But sec id. (expbining th;it to rape the: r.ipist would be: contrary to "punitive
justicc tt ).
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painless in Kant's day). Or we could run the argument the other way.
Rape is psychologically and emotionally devastating in a way that
castration is not, so that the rapist actually gets less punishment than
he deserves, Which one of these views is right? More importantly,
how do we even go about answering this question (supposing we
even wanted to ask it)?
This indeterminacy gets to the core of the point about
proportionality. Proportionality in the abstract sounds desirable, a
necessary constraint on under- and (especially) over-punishment. But
unless we have a reasonable way of determining proportionality, we
are left in the lurch. Kant, as the rape example shows, was not ready
to submit the offender to the exact same punishment as the offense
he committed. In some cases, this would be simply impossible
logically, as Kant himself wdl knew. A person who sodomizes an
innocent, vulnerable child cannot himself be turned into a child and
then be sodomized. 47 So, there are difficulties that force us to move
away from strict proportionality and into rough commensurability:
most crimes can be punished in an equal way, consistent with lex
talionis, by putting the criminal offender in prison or fining him.
Hegel conceded the problem but then tried to finesse it: fines and
imprisonment do not have the "specific external shape" of, say, theft
or robbery, but they are "comparable," and it is a matter "for the
understanding to seek an approximate equivalence in this
common value. " 48
Hegel seemed to assume that fines and prison were the place to
look for an "approximate value" in punishing crimes; Kant suggested
something similar.'19 But Hegel's move here is questionable. Why is
rime behind bars viewed as the common denominator in
punishment? 50 Because it is the most often used in advanced,
Western democracies? But this simply assumes, uncritically, that
Western democracies have discovered the correct kind of
punishment. We should ask for a deeper, conceptual explanation.

47. Id.
48. G.W.F. Hegel, WrDl!,17, ill Tonry, WHY PUNISH, How MUCH!, 111pm note 2, at 47
48. See 11/so KANT, METAJ'HYSICS OF MORALS, 111pr11 note: 43, at 130 (punishments should be:
in accord with the: spirit, and not necessarily the lc:tter, of the crime).
49. Kant, Pm11l LA1r, mprn note: 18, at 33 (pcnon guilty ofthc:ft should be: put to work
by the state: "for a cc:ruin pc:riod of time: ft).
50. Why not whips of a lash?
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We can imagine some explanatory possibilities. Is imprisonment
usually the most appropriate form of punishment because it is the
closest to getting at what is wrong with most crimes, namely a
deprivation of liberty? This has been a regular answer, ever since it
was defended by Hebert Morris in his classic essay on "Persons and
Punishment. " 5 1 But we might wonder whether deprivation of liberty
is the chief wrong done by criminals, the one thing about crime that
deserves a response from the state. One might think that the essence
of the wrong done is not merely a loss of liberty, but the horror of
being a victim of a crime (the wrongness of rape is not the
wrongness of being constrained, but something much deeper and
more wounding to the individual's dignity; the wrongness of rape is
different from the wrongness of kidnapping, or even the wrongness
of an assault). There is more-much more-normative work to be
done here.
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that imprisonment is our best
approximation to a "common denominator" in punishment. Still,
there are problems with the very idea of measuring the severity of
punishments along any denominator once we abandon a strict lex
talionis approach, as do almost all modern commentators (including
Kant). 52 There are two steps we need to take in matching crimes
with punishments.
The first step is to scale crimes in terms of their badness. This is
difficult, if not impossible. We might think that an unjustified killing
is the worst crime, and the more unjustified the killing, the worse the
crime. But this ignores how some killings that are motivated by racial
or ethnic hatred might be worse than other killings, so that two
killings motivated by racism might be worse than two killings done
for money (or for honor, or for some other, more seemingly
respectable motivation). Or it might be that killing a police officer
(or the president, etc.) is worse than killing an ordinary civilian. And
certainly, after we move beyond causing a death without justification
as the worst crime, we are in very amorphous territory: [s an armed
home robbery worse than a wounding? Is kidnapping worse than
rape? Is picking a pocket worse than shoplifting? On and on it can
go, down the line. Is there any principled way we can say that some
51. Herbert Morris, Ptr10111n,1d P1mislm1t11t, i11 O N GUILT ANO INNOCENCE: ESSAYS IN
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY & MORAL PSYCHOLOGY, 31, 36 (1976).
52. KANT, supra note 45, at 130.
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crimes really are worse than others? Perhaps there is, but I have yet
ro find it. The fact that we might make some, localized comparisons
(stealing S 50 is worse than stealing $2 5) should not blind us to the
fact that we ha,·e no global scale on which to rank crimes.
Even assuming there is a principled way to scale crimes in terms
of their badness, there are problems. Assume for the sake of
argument that we have a rough ranking of the badness of crimes,
with murder at the top and then rape, then assault, then robbery,
and so on down the line. How do we determine how many years
each of these crimes should receive? This may have a deceptively
obvious answer (one which many have given), that the worst crime
should get the most years (or death} and the less serious crimes
should get successively fewer years, until we get to probation or to a
fine for the least had crime that we continue to call a "crime" (rather
than an "infraction"). But then we have to determine, first, the top
end o f the scale, and second, the i1ttc1·,•als between punishments for
crimes. 53 We could fix the top end at death, but then how far down
do we go to the next punishment? Do we fix intervals at one, five, or
ten years (or days)? How do we decide how finely grained the scale
of punishments should be? No matter that we don't know even how
ro determine what is in the universe of available punishments in the
first place. 54
Consider an example. In Norway, a mass murderer was
sentenced to twentyAone years in prison. s; Many were outraged, and
said so at the time, but how do we know that this punishment is
retributivcly unjust? If we believe in the death penalty, then we may
have our answer: he should be put to death. But take the death
penalty off the table (or if you want to leave it on the table, imagine
another crime, such as a violent rape, for which one would not
deserve the death penalty under lex talionis). If the killer deserves
more than twenty-one years, how do we know this? What is it about
his crime that makes it a matter of retributive justice that he serve

53. Stt also Russ Shafer-Landau, 111t Fnilllrc of Rtrrib11ti'l'im1, 82 PHIL. STUO.: INT'L J.
FOR PHIL. ANAL\'TIC TRADITION 289, 308 ( 1996 ).
54. For example, is death a permissible punishment? ls torture?
55. uura Smith-Spark, Norn•n_v Killer A11dcrs Rrci1•ik Ruled S1111,, Girm 2l•Ycnr l'risun
Term,
CNN.COM
(Aug.
24,
2012),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/24/world/curopc:/norway-brcivik•trial.
Brcivik
killed
sevc:nty·sevc:n people:. His sentence: is subject to extension at the end of the: 21 year term.
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any time in prison at all, let alone twenty-one years? Why not simply
public shaming?
If we say, in response, that public outrage, or public sentiment
more generally, should determine the appropriate level of
punishment, 56 then retribution emerges as something nearly empty
philosophically speaking, a theory that can give us no critical
perspective on how much punishment a given crime should receive. 51
The same also applies if we say that the right punishment is up to the
discretion of the judge because we do not know how to determine
what limits the judge should work within. In short, retribution
promises a proportionality constraint, but it gives us no resources to
see how that constraint might yield not just a determinate result but
nny result, even a ,-ange of results. This has to be considered a
serious, indeed almost devastating, failure of rctributivism. It says we
should punish, but it cannot say how much we should punish: even
worse, it cannot even provide a principled way we would go about
discovering the answer to the "how much" question.
B. T71e Modern Retrib11tivists: Morris, Hampton
Two of the most interesting and colorful, and indeed most
compelling, philosophical theories of punishment in the twentieth
century have both been retributivist. They take their inspiration from
Kant and his retributive theory. They, like Kant, express a concern
for respect and equality. But where Kant speaks in lofty and
transcendental terms, they seek to interpret retribution in slightly
more real-world terms. Herbert Morris puts retribution in terms of a
binding contract that we enter into with others of our society: when
we violate those terms we owe it to society to "pay back our debt."
Jean Hampton develops her retributive theory as one that involves
giving an expression of respect to the victim of a crime to "balance
out" the contempt that the criminal has shown her or him.
With Kant, I developed my criticism of him on a largely
theoretical basis. I questioned whether punishment was necessary for
56. In rc:cc:nt yc:3fs, Paul Robinson h3s bc:cn the most voc:il and consistent :idvocatc of
this approach. Sec: his classic c:ssay with fohn Darley, 77" Utility uf Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV.
453 ( 1997) (arguing that sc:ntc:ncc:s should be: assigned basc:d on a community's pc:rcc:ption of
"just deserts"). At the very least, the critical potential of such an account depc:nds on the
(possibly shitting) perceptions of the community as to what is "just."
57. I f we rely on public opinion to determine sentences, then we 3fC subject to changes
in those opinions: thc:y m;1y be quite: harsh at one time, :ind lenient at the: other.
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showing respect to an offender and his choices. I also wondered
whether he could follow through on his claim that retribution could
specify "proportionality in punishment" in any meaningful sense.
Here I proceed a little differently. I think that Morris and
Hampton's theories arc much more attractive, metaphysically
speaking, than Kant's, although I suspect they do not escape the
theoretical difficulties that bedeviled Kant. But this is not my main
concern here. Rather, I proceed against Morris and Hampton by
noting the serious pmctical difficulties their theories encounter.
1. Herbert Morris

Herbert Morris was certainly one of the most influential, if not
the most imaginative, retributivists of the twentieth century. For
Morris, the controlling metaphor for punishment is quite literally
paying back a debt tbnt we oive. Society for Morris is a contract we
make with others: we obey the laws, and in exchange for that, we get
the benefit of living in a society where the rule of law is enforced.
When we break the law, this bargain is shattered, but not irrevocably.
If we pay an extra burden back to society, then we can regain the
equilibrium that our crime has disrupted. In a word, it is tit for tat. 58
Accordingly, when we break the law, we have to pay society back,
and not because of societal stability or some other good. We c tn
imagine that society could survive a certain number of crimes that go
unpunished (indeed, it almost certainly docs). But that does not
remove the unfair advantage that those who commit the crimes have
over the rest of society. They get to commit their crime, and in so
doing they do not follow the constraints society has laid down on
everyone. Punishment's purpose is to rather forcefully put those
constraints back on those who have recklessly cast them off. 59
In an admiring but critical essay, Jeffrie Murphy criticized
Morris's theory in a way that has, to my mind, never been
sufficiently rebutted. 60 The premise of Morris's theory is that we all
start out roughly equal. Indeed, Morris explicitly said so in his
essay. 61 But this is obviously not true. 61 We do not all get the same
58. Morris, mprn note 51, at 33.
59. Id. :it 34-36.
60. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Marxism 1111d Rrtrib11tior1, ill Tonry, WHY l'UNISH, How
MUCH?, mprn note 2, :it 127.
61. Morris supposes that men arc "roughly equal in strength and abilities." Morris,
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benefits out of society. Murphy cast his objection in strictly Marxist
terms, by thinking of the inequality that mattered as inequality of
resources. 63 For some, society provides them with lots of resources
and the law protects those resources. Others have little or nothing
and their material and social deprivations prevent them from getting
more. Those on the losing end of the societal bargain do not start
out on equal terms with the rest of society, so when they commit a
crime and arc punished, that punishment is not returning society to
an ex ante state of equality. It is simply reasserting the earlier,
unequal state. In short, if the opening conditions of society arc not
fair, punishment isn't fair, because it isn't restoring an initially fair
starting point. The person who was never given anything by society
to start with doesn't "owe" it anything.
But we can make a claim against Morris that is broader than
simply the Marxist one about economic inequality; it is in this form
that the argument is at its most persuasive because it avoids the
Marxism of Murphy. For Morris might respond that even if there is
inequality of resources and social conditions, there is still a rough
legal equality-equality of the protections of the law against
violations of property, person, and life. We arc all equally .. formal"
citizens before the law: we are protected by the rule of law, especially
when it comes to the criminal law, even if the rule of law sometimes
perpetuates and deepens real, actual, material inequality. This
objection seems especially compelling against Shawn Bayern's
reformulation of Murphy's argument: Bayern emphasizes the private
burdens that people may individually suffer in society and argues that
Morris's argument fails to take these private burdens into account. 6 4
But if the criminal law protects everybody, Morris can still say that at
least our protections under the law are equal, whatever our other
private burdens and disadvantages might be.
But it seems patently untrue that the law is enforced equally. In
America, the law that protects people against acts of violence or theft
is not enforced and implemented in a fair or impartial way such that

n1pr11 note: 51, at 33.
62. Murphy, supra note: 60, at 130.
63. Id. at 144. This simplifies Murphy's brilliant :md sophisticated article to a great
dc:grc:c:; still, I think I gc:t at the: most importmt aspect of it.
M. Shawn Bayc:rn, 77,e S(q11ifit111ue of Private B11rdm ,md Lnsr Bmefin far a Fair·Play
A11aly si1 of Ptmfrhmmt, l 2 NEW. CRJM. L. REv. 1 (2009).
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all equally benefit from the law. 65 The poor and Afric:m Americans
simply do not receive as much in the way of legal justice as rich and
white people do. 66 In fact, many times, they are victims of the unfair
enforcement of the law. To say that the poor and African Americans
have gotten a "fair deal" by the law as it is actually enforced is by and
large empirically false. 67 To rephrase it in Morris's terms: for many in
society, the "social contract" is a bad deal because it is unequally
enforced against them, and indeed ends up being a tool of
maintaining social inequality rather than correcting it.
All of this is to say that Morris's retributivism does not describe
modern society, and its unequal enforcement of the laws. Morris
might admit that if society does not fit his description, then society
should not endorse retributivism as a theory of punishment, at least
not yet. His theory, in short, becomes an ideal theory of
punishment. We should work towards social and legal equality
(although perhaps for reasons other than that such equality would
make retributive justice possible), but until we get there, Morris's
theory does not pull much weight. Murphy reinterpreted Morris as
offering just such an ideal theory, and it explains why Murphy was
able to hold on to Morris's theory for as long as he did. 68 Some do
not interpret Morris this way, however, and assert it is a suitable
justification for punishment in the status quo. I think this is wrong,
unrealistic, and harmful. I think that the most we can say about
Morris's theory is that it is a theory for a society very far from our
own, one that we may never reach. 69 Something similar holds for
Jean Hampton's theory of retribution.
2. Jean Hampton
If Morris gives Kant's ideas content by relying on a "bargain"
between those in society, Hampton instead refers to the esteem or
respect that is promised-and guaranteed-by a liberal society to its
65. Ser, t.g., JEFFREY REIMAN, THE RICH GET RICHER, THE POOII. GET PRISON (8th
ed. 2006) (documc:nting the m,my wJys the: criminal justice: system is biasc:d against 1hc: poor).
66. See the c:spedally powc:rful indictment of the: American criminal justice system in
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM Cl\OW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS (2010).
67. Su id.
68. Murph)', mprn note 60, at 130 (cJlling for a rc:stricting of sudc:ty in ordcr to
"rcnder punishment permissible").
69. There: is a problc:m with construing the: theory even this way. as ( c:xplain infra.
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members. When a person commits a crime, that person announces to
the victim by his or her actions that he or she is .. better" than the
victim: that he or she gets to do something to the victim, without the
victim being able to respond. 70 Note that the offender doesn't have
to lord it over the victim; rather, the crime itself expresses the
message of superiority. What punishment does, then, is restore the
balance of esteem in a liberal society: the criminal needs to be made
low and brought down from his previous . high" of superiority over
his victim. 71 The criminal deserves his punishment as a way of
balancing out the distribution of benefits and burdens, but a way of
canceling out the bad message promoted by the criminal.
By putting things in terms of esteem or respect, Hampton avoids
at least one aspect of the main objection to Morris, which is that he
ignores the existing inequality of benefits and burdens in society. If
punishment is designed to "balance out" resources, and the existing
balance is already inequitable, then punishment cannot restore a
balance; it will only perpetuate an unbalanced stare of affairs.
Esteem, or respect, docs not work the same way. Respect is not a
finite resource. A just state can and should show respect to
everybody, by punishing people for the wrongs that they have done.
But the same implausibility that doomed Morris's argument also
looms large for Hampton. If we say that punishment is necessary to
show respect to the victim of the crime, don't we also need to take
into account the preexisting distribution of respect and esteem in
society (something that is probably not exogenous to the
distribution of wealth and other resources)? And here we find a
situation that is perhaps even worse than the material and legal case.
Is the person who is poor and underprivileged, who commits a theft,
or even a violent crime, in a position of overall superiority to the
victim of that crime? It is hard to say, at least in the abstract. But the
fact that it is an open question (at the very least) shows the difficulty
of saying in the abstract that all crimes arc crimes in which a criminal
asserts his or her superiority, rather than need or desperation or
frustration, in committing the crime.

70, Seegmernl(v MUIU'HY & HAMl'TON, s11prn note 5, lt 115.
71. /,I, .it 134 ( The higher wrongdoers believe: thc:msc:h-c:s to be: (and thus the more
grievously they wrong others), the: harder and f.trthc:r they must f.tll if the: moral rc;ility of the
parries' relative: value: is to be: properly rc:prc:sc:nrc:d. ").
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Again, we have to descend from the abstractions of an imagined
just legal system and look at the reality of crime and justice in
America and dsewhere. In a system that works in some areas, but
not at all in others, where the rules are sometimes enforced fairly, but
often arc not, it is hard to say that the enforcement of the laws will
always reassert the balance of respect. Moreover, in a system where it
is hard to say that some crimes express anything at all, we cannot say
simply as a general matter that crimes arc ways of some people
lording it over other people. Is the juvenile who robs a store out of
pressure from members of a gang, and who does it not to gain
money, but simply to gain acceptance and a measure of economic
security, expressing his mperim·ity over the storekeeper? He may fed
a shiver of domination as he holds the gun in front of him, but this
cannot be an overall judgment of what he is doing and his situation.
For his situation is, overall, a matter of oppression more than
domination. He may be dominated by his peers, or by society at
large; he may have had a poor to nonexistent education; he may have
few opportunities for meaningful employment; he may get little or
no support from his family and friends. 12 This is not to say that the
storeowner who is robbed is in any greater position of superiority, or
that a failure of the law to respond at all would not diminish his
moral standing in the eyes of the community. 13 But this may show
even further the folly of trying co conceive of the criminal law as a
mechanism of upholding the respect people are owed; respect is a
complex and fluid phenomenon, and it is hard co say who has more
or less, or how in any given situation we can distribute it more evenly.
In short, when the juvenile who sticks up a store is punished, is
the law canceling out his domination, or is it simply dominating him
even more? The juvenile could well see it that way. That the odds
were stacked against him, and now they are even more stacked
;igainst him: he may face time in prison, and then a wrecked path out
of prison. We might imagine ideally, that the law would punish those
who commit crimes of domination, and reassert the power of society
to caned out that domination. But things in the real world are rarely

72. Sec, r.g., CORNELL WEST, RACE M.\TIERS 12-13 (2001) (noting the "profound
sense o f psychological depression, person:il worthlessness, and social desp:iir so widespread in
black America"}.
73. That is to say, there must be 1r1111e response of society to the wrong, but how great
this response should be, and what should motivate it, arc further questions.
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that simple. The social meaning of any given criminal act cannot be
distilled into a clear message o f " I'm better than you," rather than .. I
have no other choices in my life but to do this sort of thing," or "I
don't want to do this but I feel trapped," or "This is all I can do to
feel like a person." Nor can the message of incarceration be
translated into a sign of reducing the offender's expressive advantage
over society, as opposed to being interpreted as another (unfair, and
disproportionate) way in which society shows its advantage over
those who are poor or disaffected, or both. Is the person punished in
this way restored to his original position, or his he made even lower?
The answer, it seems to me, is obvious, especially given the wellknown difficulties prisoners ha,•e in reentering society.
Hampton's retributive theory, like Morris's, attempts to explain
why it is that offenders deserve punishment. It is a positive theory
because it doesn't just say that we shouldn't punish those who
haven't committed a crime, but that we have a duty to punish those
who commit crimes. Morris says we should punish because we need
to balance out an unjust state of affairs. Hampton says we have to
reset the economy of esteem, so that the high are brought low, and
the low lifted up. While they arc both well-intentioned, they arc too
abstract, and they imagine an equality of resources, or of esteem,
that simply doesn't exist in any present-day society."'
III. DOING WITHOUT DESERT 15

Part II canvassed some major theories of retributive justice: the
classic theories of Kant and Hegel and the more modern theories of
Morris and Hampton. 76 I think that when we consider the theories,
and how they spell out their notion of retributive justice, there is
much left wanting: for Kant and Hegel, the idea of proportionality
cannot be fully cashed out (despite the vague assurance that it can be
74. Hur s u Jean Hampton, Corrcttillg H1Jr1ns 1•cr1111 Righting Wro,zgs: 17,e Gofll of
Rerrib11tio11, 59 U C L A L . REV, 1659, 1699 ( 1992) ("So o f course there is a problem in
punishmg the inner city teenager givc:n this theory o f rctribution•but that is a strength o f the
theory, because punishing such a person is problematic.").
75. I borrow this title from an css.ly by Erin Kelly, with which I am in considerable
agreement. Erin Kelly, Doi,,g Witbo11t Dtstrt, 83 PAC. l'HIL. Q . 180 (2002).
76. There arc other retributive theories, o f course; but I have confined myself to tltc
ones I consider the most foundational and the most recently influential. There is also some
question in my mind whether .Ill theories th.It bc::ir the label o f "retributive" arc rt1Jl{v
rc:tnbutivc, or borrow more from other theories. I hope to address this point in future work.
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cashed out); the ideas of Morris and Hampton have more (or
perhaps further) troubles with application. They (Morris and
Hampton) seem to dream o f a world of equal resources, or of equal
esteem, that is far from actually existing. But there persists a
stubborn intuition that criminals deserve their punishment-in other
words, that bad things should happen to bad pcople. 77 Even if we
cannot say how this punishment should be measured, whether
according to lex tnli,mis or in terms of years or something else, or if
we are not yet at a place of equality where that punishment can be
given fairly or justly, the intuition remains that those who do wrong
deserve state punishment of some kind, no matter what the social
conditions. So long as we hang onto this intuition in some form, the
retributive idea will still remain with us; we will be unwilling to sign
on co the program chat says punishment is first and foremost about
crime control and not about giving people what they deserve, which
is at best a secondary and derivative concern.
So we need to get rid of the supposed primacy o f chis intuition,
at least for the purposes of punishment. When we do so, we will find
that punishment theory becomes much more open to the real world,
and it ceases to be cut off from other aspects of the criminal justice
system, such as defining what crimes there are, or what procedures
should exist to safe g u ard the rights of the :iccused, or even measures
to alleviate poverty. In short, when we give up an obsessive focus on
desert, we are able to take a much more holistic attitude towards the
problem o f punishment and will cease to see it as :1 "discrete"
problem at all. This, as it were, is the prize for abandoning the
notion that in political society, prisoners deserve their punishment,
and the point of the institution of punishment is to give people what
they deserve.
Because the idea of desert in criminal punishment goes so deep,
and is so pervasive, it requires an attack on three levels. First, I will
attempt a direct attack that the idea of desert has any role to play in
criminal justice apart from setting up certain side constraints on
punishment. The problem comes when we turn the eminently
reasonable and acceptable idea that punishment must have
constraints into an end in itself and we start entertaining ideas of
fundamental desert. The first step in getting over this misconception
77. With apologies to
l'EOJ'LE (2004 ).
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is to diagnos the root of the idea, to explain how it arose in thinking
about punishment.
My second attack is more basic and more wide-ranging, and that
is to question the idea of pre-institutional desert itself, or the idea
that we can be said to deserve anything in political society before we
have set up the institutions of political society in the first place. The
philosopher John Rawls is famous for making this attack against
ideas of pre-institutional distributive justice, but the point has been
less common in discussions of pre-institutional retributive justice.
There are intuitive reasons why this argument should also apply in
the retributive justice debate as well. The idea that desert only
emerges after we have decided on the basic institutions of society
further underscores the point that desert is at best a derivative
consideration in designing and implementing institutions o f
criminal justice .
The third attack considers what remains after the first two attacks
have been completed. It says, insofar as there remains any other idea
of desert, any other idea that we may merit reward or punishment,
praise or blame for our actions, that idea is properly considered only
outside of politics, and not in the design of our political institutions.
It would be foolish to deny that there may be ideas of religious
desert, or some such thing, so that the wicked deserve to be in hell
and the saintly deserve to be in heaven. But such a conception would
surely be ill-suited for politics. The same holds for any other idea of
desert that treats ••desert" as a fundamental concept. One can feel
guilty and the need to atone, but these arc in the end primte feelings
that are at best secondary to the state's purposes in punishing. These
feelings are matters, to put it again in Rawlsian terms, of one's own
comprehensive doctrine; 78 your bad feelings about yourself or about
others cannot be the basis of a properly political conception.
This is the preview of my attack on desert; now, on to the attack.

A. Desert as Miszmderstood Side Co1lstmint
In one of the more striking instances of great minds converging,
both John Rawls and H.L.A. Hart had similar insights on the nature
of punishment and on the roles that utilitarian and retributive ideas

78. The idc:i of :i comprchc:nsivc: doctrine was developed in JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIIIERALISM ( 1992).
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play in the justification o f punishment. i'-J The state of the argument
prior to Rawls and Hart was a stalemate: neither utilitarians nor
retributivists were able to persuade the other that their justification
was the one that best captured the true justification for punishment.
Retributivists insisted that any theory that could countenance the
punishment of the innocent-as they claimed utilitarianism could
and would do-was wrongheaded and evil. Utilitarianism responded
that retributivism would allow punishment that served no purposeexecuting last murderer on the island-and so was really, at bottom,
a form of revenge: why have people suffer for 110good reason? The
debate between these two isms is a staple of introductory philosophy
classes, and of first year criminal law courses. 80
What Hart and Rawls both saw was that the debate, if considered
as a debate where one must choose one theory over the other and
only one theory could not be solved, and shouldn't b e - o r at least
not on those terms. Both theories contain an element of the truth
and both have some fundamental failures. Utilitarianism, without a
retributive constraint, is blind to the possibility that it could justify
punishing the innocent, or punishing someone without end, if either
of these things are necessary for deterrence or the safety of the
community more generally. Many utilitarians admit this failure,
which is why many utilitarians adopt a side constraint against
punishing the innocent. But such a constraint seems rather ad hoc.
Retributivism as well has its failing, chief among them is that
retributivism, without any utilitarian aim, is empty: empty of a
satisfying reason or any reason at all 1vby punishment was necessary
or fitting for a wrong done. Many retributive theories, if only
implicitly, acknowledge this failure of retribution by "stuffing" their
retributive theories with intrinsic goals that are quasi-utilitarian at
bottom: such as ensuring democratic self-defense, or promoting
equality before the law, or reforming the offender by
"communicating" the state's disapproval of his conduct. 81
79. See Hart, mprn note 15, at 195; John Rawls, Tiro Co11aprs of R11/es, 64 l'HIL REV. 3
(1955), repri11ud iri JOHN RAWLS, COLLECTED PAPERS 20, 23 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999).
80. Su, t!,J,. DRESSLER, mpr11note I.
81. TI1esc arc all goals 1hat Markel has said, at one point or another, his retributive:
theory embodies. S u Markel & Flanders, mpm note: 7, at 938. It seems that many of these
ideas c:i.n be fully accommodated by a consequcntfalist theory, espcci:illy the need for self·
dc:fc:nsc:, and even the idea of communication, which could be part of a suitably fleshed-out
idea of specific dctc:m:ncc ( those: offenders who internalize the right values arc less likely to
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Hart and Rawls saw that neither theory could do well on its
own, because both are right, but at different levels of understanding
criminal punishment. 82 The utilitarians are right that the reason we
have punishment at all, why it is necessary for society, is that we need
to ensure the safety of communities, to control crime. If we had no
need for this, then the institution of punishment, established and
enforced by states, would have no sensible raison d'etre. There
would be no reason for a society on its own to set up punishment
just so it could punish the guilty if that had no relationship to some
other, deeper, utilitarian purpose like maintaining order or
preventing private acts of vengeance. Nor is it dear that an
institution of punishment could exist for very long if it fulfilled none
of these utilitarian purposes or worked in a way contrary to them.
Whatever the origins of punishment (if it began, say, to
institutionalize private acts of revenge), the function of punishment
in the modem, bureaucratic state is crime control.
But this is not the end of the story. We may agree that the reason
we have the institution of punishment is to control crime, but chis
fact doesn't dictate how the institution should be run, once we have
it up and running. And it is at the level of running the institution
that retributivism comes into play, not in explaining 1vhy we punish,
but in dictating /Joli' we should punish. This insight was the great
innovation of Hart and Rawls. We punish people in general because
this keeps society safe, but we have rules about what merits
punishment. For instance, one can be punished only when he has
committed a crime, and he can be punished only proportionally to
his wrong. These are retributive rules about punishment. They do
not derive from utilitarian reasons, or at least, they do not derive
obviously from utilitarianism. They are (more or less) independent
rules about when and how we can punish people. We might wonder
why we have these rules, whether they reflect concerns about human
dignity, or about fair notice, or something clsc. 83 But Hart and
offend 3g3in ). I de3l with the idea of equality before the law in the: conclusion to this essay.
82. For a longer look at Rawls and Hart in the context of debates about cost and
sentencing, see Flanders, suprn note: 9.
83. Hart grounded the prohibition against punishing the innocent on legality principles,
not directly on desert-based ideas. Set Hart, A l'rol,gomm11 to 1'1111is/1111rnt in TONJI.Y, WHY
PUNISH?, mprn note 2, 3t 200 (retribution is distinct from the "simple insistence that only
those who have broken the law-and mluntarily broken it-may be punished"). We might also
haw a prohibition against "excessive" punishment witl1out tltis being founded on anytl1ing
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Rawls say that we best understand these rules as coming in at the
level o f operation, and not at the level o f the justification o f the
institution as a whole. We don't need to be rctributivists all the way
down to sec that retributivism had some good ideas about when we
sho11/dn 't punish.
But for Hart and Rawls, we make a basic mistake when we take
the retributive constraints on punishing (don't punish the innocent,
don't punish excessively) as the reason why we punish in the first
place. To do this is to turn those constraints inside•out, to make them
do work that it is not appropriate for them to do: to place on
retributive constraints the burden o f justifying the institution o f
punishment as a whole. It would be like saying the reasons we have
government is so that we can have Fourth Amendment constraints on
the power o f the government. But this gets things exactly backwards.
We have the Fourth Amendment, among others, to constrain the
power of government, and government exists for reasons and purposes
other than what the Fourth Amendment aims to protect. The
retributivists make the mistake of turning something that restricts
punishment into something that explains why we have punishment.
O f course, retributivists might ask: why do we have this
constraint? Don't we need a notion o f desert to show why we don't
punish the innocent? But this supposes that only the notion of desert
can do this work, and not anything else. And this supposes, in turn,
that we can make sense o f desert as a stand-alone idea. But what
does it mean to say not just that the innocent shouldn't be punished,
but that the guilty actually deserve their punishment? Docs desert, in
short, exist?
B. Docs Desert Rt:ist?11"
My argument in the previous section was, in part, both
genealogical and descriptive. I wanted to explain how we might get
our intuitions about desert in the first place. We may be tempted to
dc:sc:rt•basc:d: just an intuition that some: punishmc:nt is just more: than we: can or should stand,
or that is incompatible with human dignity ( one might object to the death penalty or torture
on this ground}. O f course, a punishmc:nt can also be: c:xcc:ssivc on deterrence: grounds, when
the: punishment is greatc:r than that which is nc:cc:ssary to optimally dc:tc:r. For another attempt
co Justify proportiona1ity oursidc: of punishment theory, sc:c Alice: Ristroph, Propnrtimurlity as 11
Pri11dple of Li1111tt1I Gn1•er11111mt, 55 ntrKE L.J. 263 (2005),
84. Herc: I summarize an argument I make at length in Chad Flanders, Punishment :md
l'olirical Philosophy: The: Case: of John Rawls (unpublished manuscript} (on file: with author).
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think that the norm of not punishing the innocent exists as part of a
larger principle that says we ought to punish the guilty. But as I
suggested above, we don't need to think of desert in this way.
Instead, we can look at desert not as an independent principle
governing punishment, but rather as a short-hand way of thinking
about certain side constraints on punishment, i.e., don't punish the
guilty, don't punish disproportionately, punish like cases alike, etc.
The goal of punishment is still utilitarian, but it has side constraints.
We make a basic mistake when we turn what arc really constraints
into stand-alone principles.
But we can also levy an even stronger claim against the
retributivist. For he has not just made a mistake in thinking that what
are constraints on punishment provide the fundamental reason for
punishment. In fact, he has settled on a concept-the concept of
desert-which is, at the end of the day, empty. We cannot give any
meaningful content to desert, because desert in the sense the
rctributivist needs it to exist, does not exist.
We have already seen one aspect of this puzzle in our discussion
of Kant. There, we asked how we decide what proportionality in
punishment requires. How many years is "fitting punishment" for a
rapist? For a kidnapper? Once we gee away from a strict lex talionis
approach to proportionality, all wc have are our intuitions, and our
intuitions have precious little to go on. In fact, our intuitions tend to
"anchor" in our culture, finding what is the conventional
punishment to be the "appropriate" punishment in that case. 85 But
we have little reason to trust that our culture has magically hit on the
exact right number of years for punishment, any more than presentday Norway has, or for that matter, China in the 1500s.
There is an easy explanation for this puzzlement when it comes
to retributive proportionality, and it is this: desert docs not exist as
an independent concept. If we ask, in a vacuum, what people
deserve, we have a hard time coming up with a determinate answer.
The questions get harder to answer once we get more specific: what
does a battered wife who kills deserve? What does an armed robber
who is a juvenile deserve? Docs anyone deserve the death penalty?
The questions are hard here, but their difficulty derives from an
even more fundamental problem, which is the absence of any
1!5. For ;i discussion of "anchoring" in the contc:itt of sentencing, sec Stcphanos Bib;is,
Pim B11rg11initig O,mide tbt Shndnw 1ifTri11J, 117 HARV. L. REv. 2464, 2515-16 (2004).
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guidelines about the concept desert itself.
The best argument against desert comes from Rawls again, but
this time from his later, more mature work, A Theo1·.v of ]11stice. 86
Rawls made the argument about desert in the context of distributive
justice, but we can easily transpose it into the key of retributive
justice as, indeed, many have. 87 Rawls can be read in a radical way, as
to say that there is no such thing as an "independent" concept of
desert. Or it can be read in a less radical way, as to say that desert is a
concept not appropriate for a modern, political society such as ours.
Both arguments are, I think, devastating to the concept of desert. I
consider the first one in this section; I consider the second one in the
next. Even if we don't find the first version of the argument
persuasive, the second one is really all that we need to do away with
desert as an independent concept.
Begin with Rawls on distributive justice. Rawls says that one
principle we might think of when it comes to desert is this: give
resources to those who deserve them, who score high on some
metric of merit, or worth, or deservingness. We look at how hard
people work, or what they produce, or how good of people they are,
and then reward them accordingly. Rawls says that to do this is
impossible. Why?
One way Rawls is commonly read is that no one can deserve
anything because we don't deserve our talents. H Even our ability to
work hard is not our doing; it is something we were born with, or
were lucky enough to acquire. Because we don't deserve our talents,
we can't be said to deserve anything that flows from those talents.
This is certainly one way to read Rawls, and it is supported in some
parts by the text; I do not think it is the only way (although it seems
to me the impulse behind this reading is one worth investigating).
In this way of reading Rawls, he is a skeptic about our ability to
deserve anything, because w e - a s individual humans-don't have
the proper '"desert basis" to do so. To properly deserve anything,
we would have to be responsible all the way doivn for being who we
were, for creating ourselves almost. 89 But no one creates themselves;
86. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE ( 1971 ).
87. Sec especially the discussion in Samuel Schetllcr, J11niu 1111d Dmrr ill Libtrnl
111tory, 88 CALIF. L. REv. 965 {2000).
88. A reading givc:n forcc:fully in MICHAEL SAN0EL, LIBERALISM A."11) THE LIMITS OF
JUSTICE 34 (1992).
89. Sec: RoBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, ANI) UTOl'IA ( 1974) for this argumcnc.
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we nec:d society, we need our genes, and we can't be said to have
created those things about us. On this line of reasoning, we can't be
justly punished, because we aren't responsible for being who we are.
Again, some have read Rawls this way, but I don't think it is the
only way to read him. Consider a more "institutionalist" reading. 90
Read in this way, Rawls says that how we deserve something does
not exist apart from the institutions of society. We can only say that
we deserve something if we know the scheme or structure we are
working with: desert is a measurement that docs not exist prior to
society; it exists after society and is used for the purposes o f that
society. To take an example from R.awls's earlier essay, "Two
Concepts of Rules," we only know who deserves to win a baseball
game once we know what the rules of the game are. 91 We can only
say that someone deserves something after we know what the rules
of the game arc. Similarly, it is only after we have set up the basic
institutions of society that desert exists as a meaningful concept at
all. The question of who deserves to win the game of baseball
doesn't get any traction until we actually have an institution called
"baseball," and certain skills, talents, and results become salient.
The same applies to other institutions of society. How much
money should doctors earn? What about firemen? Should we pay
public school teachers more? 92 How do we determine these things?
Well, we need to know what system we are working with; we need to
know the rules of the game. Once we have established this, we can
go on to say what doctors should e:irn, but not before then. Bec:iuse
it turns out there is no fact of the matter about what doctors ought
to earn prior to us knowing what, in fact, society is for and what the
rules of society are in order to achieve the goals of society. What
people "deserve" will be different depending on what the
organization of that society is, what principles it is run by, and what
those principles say about desert.
For Rawls, society should be organized around the difference
principle: differences in the distribution of resources should be made
in order to help the least wdl off. 93 How much people ought to earn

90. Ser Schcfficr, supra not,; 87.
91. RAWLS, 111pra note 79.
92. For a perceptive discussion o f these issucs (focusing on desert in dinrib11tive justice:),
Ste MICH,\EL SANllEL, JUSTICE: WHAT'S THE RIGHT THING TO Do? (2009).
93. R,\WLS, supra note: 79.
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depends on what the principles of justice say about how society
should be organized. Until we know what those principles are, we
simply don't know what people deserve. To borrow from Samuel
Scheffler, there doesn't exist anything like "prejusticial dcsert." 94
Desert is a concept that we derive from justice; it has no independent
moral force, because whatever moral force it does have comes from
the principles of justice by which we define what desert is in the
first place.
The same argument applies, if we make some adjustments, to
punishment. 95 How much time do rapists and murderers descrvd
What crimes should be punished by prison, and what by probation?
What crimcs should even bc considered crimes1 We can't say what
the answers to tbesc questions are, either, until we have set up the
institution of punishment, and know what the goals of punishment
are. But this means that desert can't be understood as a concept
prior to the institution of punishment: we can't know what we ought
to punish, and for how long, until we have certain institutions set
up. This is not the same as the more skeptical reading of Rawls
which says that no one deep down has the capacity to deserve
anything, because no one is responsible for all he or she is. Rather on
this less skeptical reading, people do deserve things (and, in a sense,
they "really" deserve them to the extent that anyone can deserve
anything). But they deserve things only after we have decided what
the rules of the game arc.
Now, there will be constraints on awarding desert or meting out
punishment. There are constraints in Rawlsian distributive justice,
after all. We do not use the difference principle in all areas of life: we
don't let it rule over individual decisions, for instance, or require
families to distribute resources according to it. 96 The difference
principle is the rule that organized the basic structure of society, and
there can be other rules that limit how the difference principle
operates. The same goes for punishment, too. We have the basic
institution, set up for a particular purpose or purposes, and then we
put constraints on how we can achieve those purposes.

94. Su Schcfllc:r, mpra note 87.
95. Sec Douglas Husak, Holiitfr Rttrib11tivis111, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 991 {2000), for
similar arguments.
96. The limitations of the difference principle arc c:x:iminc:d-and critiqued-by G . A.
Cohen in G. A. COHEN, REsCUING JUSTICE ANO EQUALllY (2008).
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Rawls insists in A V,eor_v of Justice, somewhat confusingly, that
retributive justice should not be thought of in the same terms as
distributive justice, suggesting perhaps that pre-institutional desert
belongs in the former, but not the later, arca. 97 Rawls seems to think
that our pre-institutional instincts about punishment are stronger
than our pre-institutional instincts about desert. But his remarks on
this point are less than de:ir. It is true that retributive and
distributive justice have different goals. This of course is obvious: the
goal of a scheme of distributive justice is to encourage people to
work and to make sure that all inequalities of resources go to the
least well off. It would be bizarre if this were the goal of a system of
punishment! A system of punishment, rather, tries to discour:.1ge
crime :.1nd protect society, within fair limits (fair notice must be
given, the innocent should not be punished). But setting :ipart the
obvious difference in go:ils, the structure of the two institutions is
the same, :.1nd so is the place of desert within them. Desert :irises :is a
meaningful term only once we know what the rules of the game are.
In other words, people "deserve" their punishment because the
institutions of society say they do, not because there is some preinstitutional notion of desert that the institutions of society
somehow have to live up to.

C. Desen in Comprehensive Doct rines
But this may seem to move too quickly and require qualification
bec:iuse surely we have some idea of pre-institutional desert. We have
this in both the distributive and the retributive context. We have
some idea that good acts should be rewarded and bad acts should be
punished, independent from any instirutional context. Institutions,
some might object, really do exist to give shape :.1nd form to these
intuitions, not the other way around; it is not as if the institutions
create these intuitions of desert, which we then follow. Rather, we
have the intuitions first, even if they are inchoate, and hard to define.
When children sec bad things happening, they sense that wrongs
should not go unanswered, that bad men should not be allowed to
get away with doing bad. 98 Similarly, when we see someone do a
97. RAWLS, mpr11 note 79, at 314-15; stt also Flanders, mpra note: 84.
98. Herc: I am indebted to unpublished work by Thomas Simon on the: nature of our
"brute:" emotions. See Thomas Simon, Injustice Emotions ( unpublished manuscript) ( on file
with .tulhor).
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good act, we want to benefit that person: we instinctively want to
praise her. These arc not feelings created by institutions; they are, as
it were, part of human nature. Our intuitions arc responding to these
feelings. Moreover, we use these intuitions to critique existing
institutions; when people get more or less th::m what we think they
deserve, we balk.
I think this is probably true, even undeniable, but it docs not, or
docs not necessarily, affect the earlier point. For example, consider
the wide distance between our simple ("brute") intuitions of praise
and blame, and the actual institutions of distributive and retributive
justice. We again, of course, face the problem of indeterminacy in
reward and punishment. How much should the good person gain
from his good act? How much should the bad person suffer in
proportion to his wicked act? The idea that there is some preinstitutional, and yet jinn, idea of praise and blame that can give us
determinate answers to these questions seems to me to be farfetchcd. So even if we agree that we have these feelings, we still need
institutions to give a shape to them, to give them form
and precision.
Further, there is still a long way b e t ween the fact that we have
these feelings of praise and blame and the point that it is the pt11-pose
of political institutions to give expression to these feelings. There is a
gap here, which we have to take account of, and notice. We might
get mad or upset at all sorts of things, but we do not think they
should be punished, or, that they should be punished by the state. At
the very least, we need an argument as to why some things should be
punished and for how long, and we can't make this argument just in
terms of our brute feelings.
We can make this point in terms of what Rawls would later call
"political liberalism. " 99 Rawls says, rightly, that modern society is
characterized by deep conflicts over ways of looking at the world,
what he calls "comprehensive doctrines." 100 Some look at the world
religiously; others don't. Somt: subscribe to an ethics of absolute
duty; some are pragmatists. If we tried to convince one another
about these doctrines, we would be bound to fail. The argumt:nts, at
the vt:ry least, would stretch out interminably as we would be
99. RAWL'i, l'OLITICAL LIIIERALISM, mprn note: 7878. Jc:!Tric: Murphy c:xplorc:s a similar
line: of thought in JEFFRIE MURl'HY, PUNISHMENT & THE MOML EMOTIONS 64-93 (2012 ).
100. RAWLS, s11pr11 note: 79, at 12.
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starting from different places, with different experiences, and
different values. We'd never get to an agreement.
But still, we have to live with one another, so we find a way to
agree on political matters, matters that do not rely on our
'"comprehensive doctrines." To take one example: some may think
that there are religious wrongs, that some things offend God, :md
that they should be punished. But others may disagree. They may
think that God is not so easily offended, or they might think that
there is no God. There is probably no way o f successfully settling this
debate. So we try to put it off the table. We try to say, instead, let us
talk about things wc can all agree should be punished, that don't
depend on one's belief in God, or in any particular "comprehensive
doctrine."
I think the idea that there is a pre•institutional notion o f desert is
an example o f an appeal to a comprehensive doctrine. People will, it
seems fair to say, disagree fundamentally about desert. Some will
deny there is such a thing: Rawls, read one way, does precisely this.
He says (as interpreted by some) that we are not responsible for
anything because we arc not responsible for our genes or our parents
or where we were born. Some will affirm that there is such a thing as
desert, but still say that people need material preconditions before
they are properly held responsible for anything. 101 Some will say that
people always have the freedom to rise above whatever material
circumstances they face, and to do the right thing and refrain from
criminal activity. Still others will deny the existence o f free will. These
arc debates that are about pre-institutional, or pre-political, desert,
about what we might be said to deserve, before there is any society,
or apart from any societal constraints. They involve what are
quintessentially metaphysical matters, about the nature o f persons,
and their relationship to society. They arc debates that are likely to
be interminable. They qualify (if anything qualifies) as debates we
would want to keep "off the table" ifwc arc trying to figure out how
to govern ourselves, how to live together. 102 We would want to keep
that debate metaphysically simple. We would want to have a debate
about the shape o f the intuition o f punishment, about what

IO I. As Murphy suggc:stc:d in his critique of Morris. S a Murphy, mpra note 60.
I 02. Sec: also the: similar argument made: by Jeffrie: Murphy in Jc:fTric Murphy, It,trib11ti1111
1111d tbe Srate's foterest i11 P1111islm1mt, i11 NOMOS XXVII: CRJMIN.I\L JUSTICE 156--04 ( J.
Roland rennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1985).
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punishment is for, that does not depend on deciding deep questions
o f responsibility and desert. 103
So we might agree that there is something like pre-institutional
desert, some first or original principles of merit and demerit before
we enter into society, but whatever that idea is, whatever shape it
might take (determinate or indeterminate, religious or secular,
Kantian or Marxist), it cannot be used as the basis of political society.
When it comes to politics, we have to look for rules that we can all
agree on about the aims and purposes of punishment.
This debate, I think, will look a lot like the one Rawls and Hart
described in d1eir early essays. We will look at punishment as a matter
of crime control first and foremost, which is precisely why we would
need an institution like punishment. 104 It would also include a
discussion of side constraints, about not punishing the innocent. Bur
the debate about side constraints would need to be (at best)
incompletely theorized. 105 We would not want to rely on a deep
theory about why we should not punish the innocent and punish
only the guilty. We should give notice, we should punish fairly, and
we should not punish excessively. All of these requirements can and
should be separated from the idea that we should punish people
because they deserve it in some pre•institutional sense.
Those who wanted to make the argument that their brute
feelings demand justice would need to make a political argument
about why the institution of punishment should correspond to their
feelings. Their feelings alone are not sufficient, publicly acceptable
grounds for punishment. Thus, when Michael Moore writes that he
would fed so guilty he would want to die if he had committed a
murder, this is not an argument that he should be punished. 106 It is
simply a report of his feelings. Even group feelings are not a political
argument. This is not to say that they cannot be made into one, but
as they stand, they do not rise to that level.
I 03. This docs not mean that there: an., no ways in which parts o f retributivism may be
part o f a properly political conception. Mostly, I am doubtful that :my notion o f desert can
properly be called "political."
104. We should not, however, "beg the institution" o f punishment, What we need is
crime control: whether criminal punishment is the best way to achieve this c:nd is an open
question, For an analysis o f this question, Jtt DAVID ROONIN, THE l'ROIILEM OF PUNISHMENT
(2008} {adrncating tlte abolition o f prison).
I 05. S u CAss SUNSTEIN, LEG.-\l REAsONING & l'Oll11CAL CONFLICT (1996 ).
I 06. MICHAEL MOORE, PL-\CING BL-\ME 145 ( 1997) (stating that if he had killed a 23·
year-old woman, he "would feel guilty unto death"),
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So does pre-institutional desert exist? It may, but if it does, it is
not a suitable ground for designing institutions of punishment. For
one, it is too indeterminate: we cannot get specifics about what to
punish, and how, from intuitions about bad acts. For another, preinstitutional desert does not give us the right kind of reasons for
building and maintaining just institutions.

IV. RETRIBUTIVE THEORY IN PRACTICE
Traditional versions of retribution fail as a matter of a theory. In
its "popular" theoretical forms, the ones familiar from first•year
criminal law classes and given sophisticated shape say, in Kant or
Hegel's philosophy, or in Morris and Hampton's modern-day
updates, retribution doesn't work. Retribution doesn't work because
when we try to spell it out, we either get incoherence and
indeterminacy, or worse we get a type of unworldliness and unreality:
a society in which the laws are enforced equally, or that people start
out on a level playing field, which crimes upsets and punishment
restores. But the problems go even deeper. The very idea that
anchors retribution, the idea that gives it its moral force and power,
the idea that we deserve punishment when we have done wrong, is
either empty, waiting for content from utilitarian norms, or at best
an idea beset by controversy, and inappropriate for political debate.
For in political debate we need consensus, we need agreement, and
we can't get this with as fuzzy a notion as desert.
In the retributive picture of the world, people freely commit
crimes, and they subsequently deserve punishment. Punishment
shows respect for those who are punished, it shows them that they
are taken seriously, that their actions have not gone unnoticed, that
(in a slightly perverse way) the community cares about them. If
society did not care for the criminal, they would treat the criminal,
or try to threaten him or her, or worse, ignore him or her.
Punishment demonstrates that the criminal and his acts matter.
Society on the retributive picture is by and large fair (in the
metaphor of Morris, a fair bargain), either as :i matter of empirical
fact, or as a kind of transcendental truth. Crime damages that
fairness: someone is getting away with something at the expense of
all of us. We, as a community, have to react to this harm against us,
not merely the physical harm that, say, murder or assault or robbery
or rape represents, but the moral and political harm that the crimin:il
act represents. The punishment symbolically negates that h:irm, by

347

BlUGHA,\il YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2014

either forcibly resetting the balance of bendits and burdens (Morris)
or correcting the false message the criminal presents by his crime
(Hampton).
This is a vision of the world that is stirring, almost ennobling,
certainly inspiring, and possibly even aspirational (when charitably
read). It helps that some of the writers in the retributive tradition are
brilliant prose stylists. Their writing moves. In fact, it is almost
tempting to read some modern retributivists, such as Morris and
Hampton, as pointing to ideals of punishment. We may not be able
to punish, justifiably, on their theories 1101v, but someday (when
things are more equal} we might be able to. But even this seems a
little strange. We should not try to inhabit an ideal world because
that would enable us to punish more justly; an ideal world is a
worthy goal in its own right (if anything is). 107 Nor docs it answer
the pressing question, what do we do in the meantime about crime
and punishment? 108
On this last and most vital of questions, I maintain that the
retributive theory has little to say: it is too caught up in ideals and
abstractions. And when it does have something to say, traditional
retributivism leads us in the wrong direction. Retribution faces
practical as well as theoretical difficulties.
A. R e t rib11tion ns Limited in Practice

Consider four areas of criminal justice that are among the most
hotly debated today, and that will be exemplary for my purposes. In
these three areas, retribution either has nothing to say, what it says is
useless, or what it says is positively harmful.
1. Cost containment

Amazingly, we have reached a point in American criminal justice
where there is actually positive legislative pressure against building
more prisons and increasing sentences for criminal offenders. 100 One
would have thought that this might have never come to pass. There
has traditionally been considerable political upside to being tough on
107. C f Murphy, mprn no1c 60, at 144 (changing "basic social relations" the key IO just
punishment).
108. I discuss the: IPP bc:twc:c:n the: idc:al and the: real at greater length in my P11rda11s n11d
tl,e 11,earyuftbt "Sua11d Btst,"65 FLA. L. REv. 1559 (2013).
109. Stt Dagan & Tc:lc:s, s11prn note: 9.
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crime. And conversely, one gains little by being seen as sympathetic
to prisoner's rights or co the rights of criminals. Moreover, prisoners
have no organized lobby, save some civil rights groups and the
members of the prisoner's families. The prison industry (public and
private), however, does have considerable lobbying force, and has an
interest in filling beds and building prisons. 110 Moreover, criminal
punishments may tend to ratchet "up" over time, as long sentences
become the new baseline, and the new outrageous crime needs co be
more than the current baseline. 111
But the recent financial crisis has proven to be a strong enough
counter-trend to this "natural" state of affairs. Prisons and prisoners
cost money to house and feed. Guards and new buildings are
expensive. So something amazing has happened: conservatives,
previously "tough on crime" have now become, in the current
phrase, "'smart" on crime. 112 They have realized that many states
cannot afford to spend more on criminal justice, or at least on
criminal punishment. They arc looking at alternatives to prison: they
are looking to probation, to treatment, and to decriminalization.
Can retributivism say anything about this issue? Not really, at
least historically. Or if it does say something it says that this move to
controlling costs is mistaken. Punishment is a matter of justice, Kant
says in several places, as do many contemporary retributivists. We
should not change or alter the proper punishment for someone
because we need to save money, or because an alternative is cheaper.
The murderer must be executed, even if there is no social purpose
provided by the execution, or even if leaving him in exile would be
cheaper. This harshness is part of the legacy of Kant on punishment.
Some retributivists have tried to make retribution more "'real
world" by saying that giving people what they deserve is only one
factor among many that judges and legislators have to weigh, that
retributive punishment is not an absolute duty, but a good among

110. Charles Blow, Op-Ed., Pla11tt1tiom, Prisons, 1111d Profiu, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2012,
at A21 ("[O)n almost a daily basis, local prison officials arc on the phones bartering for
prisoners with overcrowded jails in the big cities.").
111. See Chad Flander:,, Shame a11d rbt Meanings ,if P1111isl1111mt, 54 CLEV. ST. L REV.
609,631 (2006).
112. Su, t.g., Stam11ent of Prfociples, RIGHTONCRIME.COM, 11v11ilable at
lmp://www.rightoncrimc.com/thc-consc:rvativc:•casc•for•rcform/sratcmc:nt•of•principlc:s/
( lase visited Mar. 15, 2014) (describing the "conservative case" for reforming prisons and jails).
See also mpra note: 9.
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other goods. 113 But how should we weigh this good compared to
other goods, how do we manage the trade-off? How do you weigh
the justice of a punishment, the necessity of punishing evil, with
other factors, such as saving money? Traditional retributivists would
say you can't: justice can't be "balanced off' against other factors,
without missing the point of what jtJstice is. Contemporary
rctributivists give us no guidance as to how we should balance off
retributive justice and why we would ever want to. 11 Retribution
here m1m1cs the problems with absolute rights (rights as
"trumps" ) u s in other areas. It gives, at best, no guidance and at
worst guidance o f the wrong sort by saying that we should simply
ignore cost, as if this were possible in the real world.
2. Mass incarceration
The term "mass incarceration" has now become familiar in
penological discourse. 116 The statistics are also drearily and
depressingly familiar. Several numbers stand out: the percentage of
adult Americans (and especially AfricanTAmericans) in prison, and
the sheer number of Americans in prison compared to the rest of the
world. 111 What does this phenomenon mean about America and
what should be done about it? Like the problem of prison costs
spiraling out of control, many remedies have been talked about, and
floated. 118 But most importantly, mass incarceration is now treated as
a problem in itself, over and above other problems with the
administration and functioning or criminal justice. 119

113. Ser Cahill, mpra note 8, at 866-67 (author's approach "docs not view desert as a
fundamenul ex ame obligation (or restraint), but r:ithcr as one good to be balanced against
other possible goods in determining whether punishments appropriate: in a specific case:").
114. A point I make in more detail in Flanders, 111 Dtfm1e of P 1 1 1 1 i s l m 1 m t17,enr_v, n11d
Contra Srepl1tn, IO OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 243 (2012).
115. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING llJGHTS SER.IOUSL\" ( 1978} (defending notion of
"rights 3S trumps"); sre nls11 Shafer-Landau, supra note 53, at 306 (strong rctributh·e theory
"forbids any cost-benefit calculations in che crc:ation or application of sentencing guidelines").
I 16, Ste ALE.'<ANOER, s11pra note 66.
117. Adam Gopnik, 77,e Cn11i11g of Amerita, NEW YORKEJt. Jan. 30, 2012, at 72
(describing the rise of mass incarceration in America).
118. Su, e.g., Carol Stc:ikcr, Mass lmpriimwu11t: Ca11m, Cnnseq11mus, and F."it S1rnte._qiu,
9 O m o ST.,. OF CRIM. L. 1 (2011 ).
119. Dorothy Roberts, V,e Soria/ and M11rnl Cost nf Mass bimrttratio11 i11 Africa11
Amerirn11 Cumm,mitfrs, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (2004).
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Can retributivism even recognize mass incarceration as a
problem? I am not sure it can. To do so, it would have to be more
specific about particular sentences and why they are unjust; it would
have to say more about what kinds o f things should be punished. I f
we leave these questions to elected legislatures, then we risk getting
no critical purchase on the problem o f mass incarceration because
the problem is by and large a democratically created one. Or if we
leave the problem of long sentences open because we cannot say
what proportionality requires, then we cannot criticize some
sentences as excessive, at least not without any precision. Nor does
retribution as a theory o f punishment have anything to say about
overcrirninalization, a phenomenon that is, for obvious reasons,
closely related to mass incarceration.
But if we are worried about the social and economic costs o f
punishing people too long, we might see mass incarceration as a
waste o f both money and lives. Or as a matter o f political philosophy,
we might see mass incarceration as presenting a problem, even a
crisis, o f state legitimacy. 120 Retribution is at best silent about the
problem of mass incarceration, or says: if prisoners are justly in
prison, then mass incarceration is required as a matter o f justice.
There can be no "further" problem o f the large number of people
behind bars on the retributive way of looking at things.

3. Mandato,y minimmns
Not unrelated to the previous problems is the existence of
mandatory minimums-that is, fixed minimum sentences for certain
crimes. Mandatory minimums for some nonviolent drug crimes
have been the focus for some critics, but the problems with them
can be described in general terms: mandatory minimums give
prosecutors too much power, force judges' hands at sentencing, and
frequently result in sentences that are too long. The solution to this
is to get rid o f the minimums, or lower them substantially, and give
judges more discretion in sentencing offenders.
Does retribution have anything to say about this? We might
think it does. Retribution might say that some o f the minimums are
too long, and so are disproportionate, but it lacks any firm basis to
120. Sc:c in this regard, the: important pieces by James Forman and Glen Loury. James
Foreman, Jr., WlJyCare Abo11tMass llmmerntimi?, 108 MICH. L. REV. 993 (2010); LOUII.Y,
RACE, INCARCERATION, &AMERICAN
VALUES(2008).
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say so for reasons we have already canvassed. Again, retribution as a
general theory is too indeterminate on what counts as proportional
or not: it cannot say what is too long for any given crime. If the
retributivism says that, instead, we fix the minimum by asking
people! what is an appropriate minimum sentence, then retribution is
openly giving up on its critical purchase. For the minimums that we
have arc precisely the consequences of the "people" acting through
the legislature to fix the appropriate sentences. 121
In fact, if anything, retribution would seem to favor something
like mandatory sentencing not just for selected areas of the criminal
law, but for every area. Retribution favors a principle of equality in
sentencing, at least as a formal principle: like crimes should be
treated alike, and no differences in punishment based on the
sensibilities of the offender or on whether a longer or shorter
punishment is necessary for deterrence. By treating like offenders
alike, the retributivist treats people equally; as such, the retributivist
will tend to be against giving judges too much discretion in
punishing offenders because this leads to unequal treatment of
similarly situated offenders.
4. The death penalty

The death pern1lty has long been an object of contention and
criticism, 112 with some of the chief arguments defending it coming
from retributivists (Kant, again, is the main target). Where the
deterrence argument for the death penalty has seemed indeterminate
or vague or worse, retribution has seemed to be a reliable "go-to"
justification for putting people to death for their crimes. But
recently, some have maintained that retribution shows why the death
penalty is immoral. Dan Markel and Thom Brooks, for very different
reasons, have maintained that retribution positively excludes the
death penalty. Their arguments are not convincing. 123
Retributivism, at its core, says that wrongdoing deserves
punishment, and the greater the wrongdoing, the greater the
punishment. Nothing in this rules our the death penalty; indeed,
121. Paul Cass IJ & Erik Luna, M1111datory Mi11imalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. l (2010),
122. Stt DAVID GARL\NO, PECULL\R INSTITtrrlON: AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY IN AN
AGE OF AIIOLITION (2010),
123. Seegmernl(v Chad Flanders, The Case .t\!,nilut the Case Agnfost the Deat/J Pmnlty, 16
NEW CRIM. L. REV. 595 (2013).
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Kant thought that it was one of the clearest cases of retributivist
philosophy that murderers deserve the death penalty. This was
proportionality at its purest. And yet, Market's argument relies (in
part) on the idea that the death penalty offends dignity, and dignity
is a value intrinsic to retribution. 12-1 But Markel's burden here is
twofold: first, to show that dignity is indeed intrinsic to retribution
rather than extrinsic, and second, to show that the type of dignity
that is intrinsic to retribution is one that rules out the death penalty.
I am not sure this can be done. If a person gets what he deserves, the
retribution is satisfied; there is nothing inherent in retribution (as
opposed to principles taken from liberal political philosophy, or
dsewhere) that says that punishment has to be done in a dignified
rather than an undignified way. Any connection between
retributivism and human dignity is, I think, a contingent one, not a
necessary one. Nor is it obvious under a retributivist paradigm that
putting someone to death for a crime is not to treat him with
dignity; Kant certainly felt otherwise. 125 Dignity, here as elsewhere, is
a stirring word that means something, but what that something is
can be notoriously hard to define.
Brooks bases his argument on the possibility of error in meting
out the death penalty. 126 To him, retribution means not punishing
the innocent, and putting the innocent to death is a mistake that we
cannot undo. But this is, at best, merely a practical argument about
how retribution rules out the death penalty; it is also a perfectly
general one, that would apply to (and thus possibly rule out) all
punishment. 127 Moreover, it assumes that, on balance, it is worse to
kill the innocent than to not kill those who deserve to be executed.
That the balancing should go like this (rather than the other way,
where not giving people what they deserve is worse than killing an
innocent person) is nowhere entailed by retributivism.

124. Set Dan Markel, Srnu, Be Not Proud: A R,rrib11tfrist Dtfrnse of tl,e Cu111111111nri1m of
Drnth Ro1r n11d tbt Abulirim1 of tl1e Drath Pmnlty, 40 HARV. C . R · C . L . L . REv. 407, 466-67
(2005).
125. Kant, Pmnl Lnw, mprn note 18, at 32 (Jc:ath only appropriate punishment for
murdc:t; man of"honor" would choose death r:ither than pc:nal servitude:).
126. Thom Brooks, 11.&triburion & Cnpitnl 1'1mi1l1mmt, i11 RETRlBUTMSM: ESSAYS ON
THEOII.Y AND POLICY, mpra note: 2, at 236-38.
127. A common rebuttal to this is that death is irrevocable:, but a prison sentence: is not.
For an effective: response to this sc:c: MATTHEW KRAMEII., THE E n u c s OF CAl'ITAL
PUNISHMENT(201 l).
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If we want a cogent argument for abolishing the death penalty,
we should not look to retribution for it. Indeed, given how empty
retributivism is in its prescriptions, it is unclear that retribution can
rule out any mode o f punishment. \Vhy couldn't torture be an
acceptable punishment, if it gives the guilty what they deserve? If the
retributivist cannot say what the guilty deserve, only that they
deserve punishment, the retributivist cannot give us a positive
reason to oppose torture in punishment. We have to look for that
argument elsewhere.

B. Why Retribzttion Fails, Practical(v Speaking
Why does retribution seem to say so little on so many pressing
issues o f criminal justice, and when it does have something to say, it
seems to say the wrong thing? These exemplary examples represent
the general failings o f retribution. I think these failings can be
attributed to rwo features o f retribution, which we can call, for
convenience, clomre and compartmentalization.
By closure, I mean that retribution, in most o f its versions, gives
us a theory that is mostly detached from any empirical truths about
the world. It disdains (sometimes explicitly, as in Kant, but mostly
implicitly) any reliance on the .. facts on the ground" about resource
distribution or about moral responsibility. It tends, as with Kant,
towards a reliance on transcendental truths about human beings, or
speaks in generalities about equality and dignity. It does not come to
grips with the facts on the ground about crime and punishment and
instead attempts-but largely fails-to provide an ideal theory
o f punishment.
By compm·tmentalization, I mean that retribution focuses solely
on the moment o f punishment and resists any discussion about
criminal justice in general. It sets as its task only the question o f what
would justify punishment for crimes, and leaves to another day or
another theory subjects that would othenvise be essential to a
complete theory o f the criminal law.

1. Closure
We can take the theories o f Morris and Hampton as providing
good instances o f c/ostn-e to the real world. Morris and Hampton do
not consider what actually may be true o f equality in the real world
(except, perhaps, by simply assuming that all people are in fact
354
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equal). Nor do they spend much time considering whether people
are responsible in the way that their theories would require. But
both of these things would seem to be essential to the plausibility of
their theories. I f we arc not equal in many respects, materially or
legally, or if our social conditions mean our acts do not give us an
advantage, or express our superiority, then the theories of Morris
and Hampton are prima Jacie implausible, however elegant and
stirring they may be qua theories.
The retributivist commitment to formal equality shows up clearly
in its support of mandatory sentencing. For retributivists, mandatory
minimums would seem not to go far enough, for there really should
be 110 variations in sentences for the same or similar crimes.
Discretion is the enemy of equality, which is here understood as
Jonna/ equality: treat everyone the same by punishing the same,
regardless o f differences in background circumstances. Even if the
people committing the crime may be very different, their crime is the
same, and (formal) like must be punished with (formal) like. On a
purely retributive picrure, it is hard to make sense o f any differences
in punishments for the same crime. For on what grounds could such
variations be justified on their picture, if all that matters is the
individual's decision to commit a certain crime? 128
Kant, at least, was more honest that his theory was not about the
empirical world. 129 For Kant, this transcendence from the empirical
was partly the point: we could still think of justice being done above
the messiness o f the real world, even if this justice took place on
another plane. My sense is that most contemporary retributivists
would reject Kant's metaphysical transcendentalism, but they do not
engage with facts about the real world in a way that such a rejection
would imply. They keep Kant's disdain for the world while
discarding his overall world view, and end up at best with a theory
that applies only in an ideal world.
The retributive closure to empirical facts comes across clearest
when it comes to the reality that retributive justice costs money.
Retribution tends to put things in terms o f justice, which by its
nature-by being an intrinsic good-resists assimilation to costbenefit analysis. How do we weigh justice against considerations o f
cost? Again, we might say that the resistance to cost considerations is
128. For an cxccUc:nt historical Jnalysis o f this idea o f equality, sc:e Whitman, mpm note 5.
129. Supra Part I. Hc:gd seemed to follow K.int in chis "unworldliness."
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part of the point of traditional retributive justice: justice must be
done, even if the heavens fall, as Kant s:1id. But this very resistance,
which some retributivists m;iy see as 3 fe:1ture of their theory, is
actu:1ll y a bug when it comes to the application of the theory. Either
we have to say that cost is irrelevant when it comes to punishment,
that it would be wrong even to consider the fact that criminal justice
costs money, or we simply have to reject retribution as a plausible
theory of criminal justice in the real world. 130 The former option
means just ignoring the real world, and the expenses of justice; the
latter option means leaving pure retributive theory behind.
2. Compai-tmmtalizntion
The problem of closure is compounded when combined with
what we can call the problem of compartmentalization. Retribution
presents itself as a theory of punishment; no more, no less. It does
not, or does not necessarily, say ivhnt things should be crimes. It
does not say how people should be punished (this is the source of
retribution's frustrating indcterminal.")'}. It just says w/Jy people
should be punished: they should be punished because they deserve
it. Sometimes retributivists are explicit about the limits of their
theorizing.
A theory that limits itself like retribution docs, has accordingly
limited its usefulness. It cannot have a positive theory of crime
control, because controlling crime is different than p11nis/Jfog crime.
Retribution kicks in only after a crime has been committed (however
we define crime, which retribution also has nothing to say about 131 ) .
So measures to reduce crime cannot be justified on retributive
grounds. Indeed, retributive theory on its own terms doesn't seem
even able to say why more crime is worse than less; it only says that
more crime would mean more punishment. It is even possible that a
retributive theory would lack the resources to say why a world with
130. A third option is possible, but it has so far been underspecified: that retributive
justice is a good 10 be maximized, but also to be balanced with other goods. S u Cahill mpra
note 8, at 861, 867 ("Any funhcr exploration of just how good desert is relative to other
consequences is, again, beyond the s,opc of the present Artidc . . . .''),
131. A point I make in my response to Gray and Huber. S u Ch:id Flanders, Ca11
Rctribmfrism Re Pn'.!}rtsti1•e?: A Rrpl,v to Priifrssor Gray a11d J,m111li1111 Huber, 70 Mn. L. REV.
166 (2010); m alro Shafc:r-Lmdau, 111pr11 note: 53, at 293 ("Thc:sc {retributivist] \'iews
pmuppnse the existence o f 3 criminal code, r;ithcr than providing assistance in construc1ing
um:.n).
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